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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the psychically toxic nature of shame, and the way in which it manifests so 
acutely within intersubjective spaces, it has historically been under-researched and 
under-theorised. However, a burgeoning of literature in recent years has brought an 
increasing awareness of shame as a pathogenic force. An investigation of this noxious 
affect is especially pertinent in the context of qualitative feminist research in South 
Africa, marked by a myriad of class, gender and race differentials between researcher 
and researched. I therefore consider the significant effect of shame on a specific 
dialogue which unfolded between myself and a research participant in the course of 
interviewing rape survivors in Cape Town. The interview is examined through the dual 
analytic resources of psychodynamic theory and reflexive research practice, with a 
view to gaining a deeper understanding of the implications of this noxious affect for 
feminist reflexive research. The analysis reveals the ubiquitous manifestations of shame 
within the intersubjective space, traceable through the three markers of the affect; 
namely the content of the narrative, the form or structure of the interaction as well as 
my own emotional memory of the event. The analysis tracks the shame which arose in 
such a research context, demonstrating how shame neither belongs exclusively to the 
self or the other, but is unavoidably generated, exacerbated and maintained within the 
relational, intersubjective field. A particular exploration of its manifestations on the 
micro-level of the research relationship through the analytic resource of psychodynamic 
understanding, highlights the necessity of feminist reflexive practice considering shame. 
What is highlighted is a need to reflexively locate the emotion within our racialised, 
gendered and institutionalised research relationships, and to wrestle with the 
implications this has for meaning-making and embodied subjectivity. Such a 
consideration would arguably provide invaluable insights for feminist reflexive 
research and practise as it pays critical attention to positionality, reflexivity, the 
production of knowledge and the power relations that are inherent in research processes.   
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Shame is pervasive, and contagious. Shame is ashamed of itself. Shame activates 
shame. The mystifying dualism of shame is that it is at once an isolating, intimately 
intra-psychic phenomenon seeking concealment, yet remains deeply embedded in a 
visual and public interpersonal space where the self is violently and unexpectedly 
exposed to the critical gaze of the Other. Shame speaks to the core of the self,  
unlike guilt, which many authors have argued is characterised by a focus on an 
external event or action (Kaufman, 1995; Lewis, 1971; Morgan, 2008; Tangney & 
Dearing, 2002). The source of shame can therefore never be completely in the self or 
in the Other, but is a rupture of what Kaufman (1989, p. 22) calls the “interpersonal 
bridge” binding the two. For this reason, many theorists consider shame to be the 
most deeply disturbing of all the affects, inherently embedded within the realm of the 
intersubjective space between self and Other.  
 
Like Kometsi (2001), who writes on the manifestations of shame in a uniquely South 
African, multi-racial clinical setting, I have become increasingly aware of the myriad 
of ways in which shame manifests itself so subtly yet so powerfully within our daily 
interactions. The pervasive and potentially paralysing nature of shame and its 
particular relevance to a South African research context became no more apparent to 
me than in the course of interviews that I, as a researcher (white1, middle-class) have 
had with rape survivors (coloured, working-class). This research had as its original 
aim to delineate the network of discourses in which the rape of women is embedded. 
However, I have come to understand that our co-constructed shame which permeated 
the research significantly affected my emotional and intellectual investments, and 
contoured my interpretations of the narrative which unfolded between myself and the 
research participants.  
 
Despite the psychically toxic nature of the affect, and the way in which it manifests so 
acutely within intersubjective spaces, it has historically been under-researched and 
under-theorised. This neglect has been attributed in the literature to Freud’s rather dim 
and inconsistent view of the affect and his decision to neglect shame in favour of guilt 
                                                 
1 The following terminology will be used consistently throughout this research: “black,” “white” and 
“coloured.” Although I acknowledge that such racially constructed terms are offensive, they are used in 
order to reflect past history as well as the reality of contemporary socio-economic divisions. 
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(Broucek 1991, Morrison, 1989), the incompetence of scientific language to fully 
capture the self’s shaming experience (Kaufman, 1989) and the phenomenon of 
“secondary shame” – that is to say the curiously contagious nature of shame which is 
ashamed of shame itself (Broucek, 1991; Lewis, 1971, Morrison, 1983, 1998).    
 
However, a burgeoning of literature in recent years has brought an increasing 
awareness of shame as a pathogenic force, thanks to the pioneering work of self-
proclaimed “shameniks” such as Morrison (1983, 1989, 1998), Lewis (1971), 
Kaufman (1989) Nathanson (1987) and Broucek (1991, 1997). Gilbert (1998) outlines 
the various schools of thought in which a wide variety of shame theories are rooted, 
from psychoanalysis to affect-cognitive and cognitive-behavioural theories. He argues 
that shame as an affect has so pervaded recent psychological theory and research that 
other emotions have in fact been neglected (Gilbert, 1998). Recently, the recognition 
of the role of shame in narcissism and theories of self-psychology by Kohut and 
others has opened the path for the optimal investigation of shame and has showed us 
how insidiously and unconsciously shame affects our lives (Morrison, 1989).   
 
Such investigation of this noxious affect is especially pertinent in the context of 
qualitative feminist research in South Africa, marked by a myriad of class, gender and 
race differentials between researcher and researched. Here, skewed power dynamics 
continue to mark intellectual relations between researcher and researched (Bennett, 
2000) and “deeply entrenched and racialised divisions between communities continue 
to shape the negotiation of power” (Swartz, 2007, p. 177). Within this context 
(significantly determined by class formations developed through the formal structures 
of colonialism and apartheid) shame is inherently linked to the politics of knowledge 
production and the limitations of our own positionings within such unequal power 
structures.  
 
Due to these inequalities which continue to mark the landscape of African feminist 
research, feminists have raised questions around the ability of white women to 
represent black women (Bennett, 2000; de la Rey, 1997; Sunde, & Bozalek, 1993). As 
a writer privileged by my class and race position, such important debates have left me 
to question my own positioning in relation to my privileged colonial heritage and my 
consequent (in?)ability to represent the voices of black women. This has perhaps been 
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in response to “an incitement to reflexive confession” (Burman, 2006, p. 316) partly 
motivated by shame. I therefore share Morrison’s understanding that the 
conceptualisation of self-exposure underlies the motivation to write on the topic of 
shame: 
 
Exposure of shame-induced feelings is likely to stimulate recurrent shame – I 
began to feel self-conscious, wondered whether I wanted to make myself 
vulnerable, to open myself up in this way to public observation and critiques. 
But then I reminded myself of the challenge we face through the inevitable 
spectre of our own shame experiences as we treat our patient’s shame. How 
better to address this challenge, I thought, than through measured exposure of 
my own shame (1994, p. 19).  
 
Contemporary theories on shame view it as an emergent, embodied property of 
relation systems rooted in intersubjective fields. Lansky (1999), for example, defines 
shame as “a complex emotional system regulating the social bond… signalling 
disturbance to the status of the self within the social order” (p. 347). Ikonen and 
Rechardt (1993) similarly see shame as intrinsically intersubjective, “a reaction to the 
absence of approving reciprocity” (p. 100). The definition of shame has been moved 
from a mere affective reaction to public disapproval to a far more complex process in 
which the self is both an agent and object of observation and disapproval in light of 
the shortcomings of the defective self being exposed (Lewis, 1971). Shame is both 
collective, a part of communal contrition (Rose, 2003), and deeply individual, yet the 
experience has a decidedly social face and is the bedrock of identity formation 
(Erikson, 1950; Kaufman, 1989).  
 
From this theoretical point of departure, it is clear that shame is necessarily situated 
within an intersubjective field, is intrinsically linked to processes of identity formation 
and is a deeply embodied experience. Shame is ubiquitous, corrosive and an integral 
part of the intersubjective space, where shame of the self resonates with the shame of 
the Other. An attunement to shame is particularly crucial in our interactions, 
considering its potentially paralysing effect and the many ways in which shame 
compels us to hide and withdraw (Morrison, 1983, 1989), to “sink into the floor and 
disappear” (Tangney, & Dearing 2002). Therefore, the importance of locating this 
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pervasive yet arguably under-theorised affect has significant implications for feminist 
reflexive research practice as it grapples with the complexities of the research 
relationship dynamic and the ultimate effect on the analyses it subsequently produces 
(Burns, 2003; Gray, 2008; Rice, 2009). Contemporary feminist research demands that 
we extend our reflexivity beyond a simple stating of identity position to include a 
greater focus on the subjective and intersubjective research experience. Merely stating 
oneself autobiographically is not enough (Bennett, 2000). As Patai (1991) argues, 
 
Sometimes these tropes sound like apologies, more often they are employed as 
badges. Either way, they give off their own aroma of fraud, for the underlying 
assumption seems to be that by such identification one has paid one’s respect 
to “difference” (p. 149).  
 
Therefore, in an effort to extend reflexivity beyond such simplistic reductionism, I 
consider the significant effect of shame on the dialogue which unfolded between 
researcher and researched within a specific interview, through the dual analytic 
resources of psychodynamic theory and reflexive research practise, with a view to 
gaining a deeper understanding of the implications of this noxious affect for feminist 
reflexive research. As Gough (2003) points out, “discussions of reflexivity rarely 
make reference to psychoanalytic theory, despite a long and rich tradition of writing 
on intersubjective dynamics” (p. 26). I therefore attempt to contribute to the debates 
within feminist research by coupling feminist methodologies with psychodynamic 
accounts of defended subjectivity (Hollway, 1989; Hunter, 2005). The aim is to 
facilitate an inquiry of the role of shame in the researcher’s relationship to research 
participants and the research process (Gray, 2008). I attempt not only to understand 
the role of shame in the research relationship which unfolded, but to consider the way 
in which it was intrinsically linked to the representations of our multiple and 
constantly shifting identities within this space, as overtly marked by the 
“intersectionality” of class, race and gender (Burman, 2006). 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
History of the study of shame 
Many authors offering a critical review on the literature on shame begin their review 
by bemoaning Freud’s neglect of this important affect in favour of guilt, and the fact 
that he had no consistent theory of shame (for comprehensive reviews of the literature 
see Morrison, 1989 and Broucek, 1991). Throughout history, dating back to Adam 
and Eve’s shame of being naked in the Garden of Eden, shame has been associated 
with the uncovering of nakedness. Freud believed that man’s [sic] natural, primitive 
state was one of shamelessness. It was only when man began to walk upright, that he 
became ashamed of his exposed genitals. Freud spoke of shame as a barrier to 
instinctual life, serving a reactive, inhibitory and prohibitive role which opposed the 
pleasure principle. In his later work, “New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis” 
in particular, he revoked his theory to highlight the feminine shame of genital 
deficiency, as opposed to the masculine shame of exposed genitals. Shame thus 
became a “feminine characteristic par excellence” (Freud, 1933/1964, as cited in 
Broucek, 1991, p. 12), and was associated with scocophilia, or the love of sexually-
oriented looking. This early theoretical conceptualisation of shame was therefore 
politically in line with existing dictates around the appropriate expression of feminine 
sexuality.  
  
Freud viewed shame as one of the major forces promoting repression and resisting the 
analytic process, but did not significantly pursue this avenue of inquiry. Speculations 
as to why shame was so under-theorised in Freudian psychoanalysis include the fact it 
was a politically motivated decision related to his conflict with Adler, whose theories 
of organ inferiority aligned themselves more comfortably with shame than did 
Freud’s own work (Morrison, 1989, 1983), Freud’s avoidance of the topic due to his 
own unanalysed shame issues (Broucek, 1991, Lansky, & Morrison, 1997), or purely 
an inevitable outcome of the historical evolution of psychoanalysis (Morrison, 1989, 
1998). Whether or not we accept these speculative hypotheses, the conclusion is clear: 
Freud’s structural theory emphasised guilt rather than shame, which delayed an 
emphasis on shame as an important area of study.  
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Despite this bemoaned neglect on Freud’s part, his introduction of the concepts of 
ego-ideal and self-regard are considered to be some of his most useful contributions to 
the study of shame (Lansky, & Morrison, 1997). Morrison (1989) argues that had 
Freud developed his theorising on the attainment of perfection in the ego-ideal, he 
may well have proceeded with an investigation of shame and its relationship to 
conflict and failures. In fact this exact pathway into the study of shame suggested by 
Morrison was closely followed by Piers and Singers (1953) in their groundbreaking 
book Shame and Guilt.  As two of the first major psychoanalytic thinkers to 
contribute to our understanding of shame, they began by highlighting what they 
viewed as the essential difference between shame and guilt, an important distinction 
which has today been elaborated on by many theorists (Kaufman, 1995; Lewis, 1971; 
Morgan, 2008; Tangney, & Dearing, 2002).  
 
“Piers and Singer (1953) posit that shame reflects a discrepancy between ego and the 
ego-ideal with the subsequent threat of rejection and abandonment. In other words, 
shame is the perceived failure of the whole self. Guilt, on the other hand, relates to a 
transgression, causing a tension between the ego and the super-ego, with the 
subsequent fear of castration. Freud (1940-52) himself made no distinction between 
the ego-ideal and the super-ego, often using the two terms interchangeably. However, 
for Piers and Singer (1953), the ego ideal is described as being comprised of 
narcissistic fantasies of omniscience, the sum of positive identifications and social 
roles, and an awareness of the ego’s potentialities and goals (Morrison, 1983). Finally, 
Piers and Singer were also two of the first theorists to emphasise bodily functions, and 
the self’s comparison to the other, as being fundamental to the shaming experience, 
thus being some of the first authors to place shame in a specifically social arena. More 
specifically, we see the beginning of shame being conceptualised as indicating a 
specific social positioning, and therefore intrinsically linked to one’s social identity.  
 
Literature on the link between shame and identity burgeoned in the 1950’s in 
particular, largely due to the work of Erikson (1950) who placed shame as central to 
his theories on identity formation, as well as Lynd (1958) and Piers and Singer (1953). 
Shame proved central to Erikson’s (1950) work on identity and the life-cycle, where 
he linked shame to the anal-phase struggles of autonomy and self-control (Broucek, 
1991). Erikson (1950) has brought to our attention the integral role which shame plays 
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in the social and individual process of identity formation. Kaufman (1989) further 
notes that the negative pole of each of Erikson’s identified life-stage crises represent 
some elaboration of shame which needs to be worked through.   
 
In Lynd’s (1958) book on Shame and the Search for Identity, she focuses on the 
phenomenological experience of shame in order to better understand its nature and 
function. Like Piers and Singer, who were writing at a similar time, she outlined the 
distinction between shame and guilt, emphasising the involvement of the whole self 
as a distinguishing characteristic of shame and a further clue to it’s centrality in 
identity. Speaking to Erikson’s theories of shame and identity, she noted that the loss 
of an identity one thought one had is as painful and shaming as the tortuous process of 
identity formation. She posited exposure, particularly unexpected “exposure of 
peculiarly sensitive, intimate, vulnerable aspects of the self” (p. 27), as central to the 
shame experience and argues that such exposure may violate the core of self:  
 
Sudden experience of a violation of expectation…results in a shattering of 
trust in oneself, even in one’s own body and skill and identity, and in the 
trusted boundaries or framework of the society and the world one has known. 
As trust in oneself and the outer world develop together, so doubt of oneself 
and of the world are also intermeshed (p. 46).  
 
It is clear then that the experience of shame necessarily involves a discrepancy 
between self and the social situation resulting in a breach of trust. Lynd (1958) argues 
that the destruction of trust so central to the shame experience results either in doubts 
about one’s own adequacy or may lead to a questioning of the basic security of the 
world around oneself and a strong contradiction of previous assumptions or 
expectations. The greater the expectation, the more acute the shame. The result, Lynd 
argues, is a heightened sense of tragedy. This shattering and isolating experience 
comes very close to Herman’s (1992) phenomenological description of the 
experiences of trauma survivors, which will be explored later on in this paper. Much 
of the literature therefore views the trauma inherent in shame as the experience of 
being harshly and unexpectedly severed from the other – the sudden realisation that 
the essentially flawed nature of the true self has been exposed, a self which falls 
desperately short of an imagined ideal.  
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 The idea of shame as it relates to a frustration of the ego-ideal, first highlighted by 
Piers and Singer (1953), is one which has been picked up on by Kohut (1966) and 
others. Kohut (1966, 1977) related shame to the frustration of the narcissistic self’s 
exhibitionist demands for which the ego is unable to provide an adequate discharge. 
This frustration is attributed to the empathic failure of self-objects, who are unable to 
ground the individual with a coherent and secure sense of self. The result is a 
formation of narcissistic expectations due to overwhelming feelings of grandiosity 
and, inevitably, the accompanying vulnerabilities which form the bedrock of shame, 
or what he termed a sense of “nameless mortification” (1977, p. 224). He viewed 
anger and destructiveness as secondary reactions to shame, stating that “destructive 
rage, in particular, is always motivated by an injury to the self” (1977, p. 116).  
 
Morrison (1983, 1989), one of the key contemporary theorists understanding shame 
from a self-psychological paradigm, primarily views shame as a response to failure in 
attaining the shape of the ideal self. He provides a framework for understanding 
shame from an internal perspective which shapes the ideal self, and has been 
instrumental in using Kohut’s writings to indicate the central importance of shame in 
the application of his self-psychology theories. For example, it is Morrison who 
furthered our understanding of narcissistic rage and violence as most often the visible 
face of shame. In his chapter on Shame, the ideal self and narcissism, Morrison (1983) 
writes that “the referent of shame, then, is the self, which is experienced as defective, 
inadequate and having failed in its quest to attain a goal. These goals of the self relate 
to ideals internalised through identification with the good (or idealised) parent, and as 
such reflect that portion of the superego contained within the ego ideal” (p. 351).  
 
The Kohutian view on shame, so well highlighted by Morrison (1983, 1989, 1998), 
has thus deepened our understanding of shame as being centrally about the self, 
identity and its narcissistic aspirations, as well as its relation to the empathic failure of 
self objects. It is therefore experienced at once intra-psychically and intersubjectively. 
For Morrison, shame is fundamentally related to narcissistic aspirations motivated by 
“a yearning for absolute uniqueness in the eyes of a designated other” (Morrison, & 
Stolorow, 1997, p. 63). Failures in self object needs lead to narcissistic vulnerability 
and shame sensitivity, with shame signalling danger to perceptions of a significant 
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Other viewing the self as unique (Lansky, & Morrison, 1997, Morrison, & Stolorow, 
1997).  
 
Broucek (1991, 1997) shares with Morrison a perspective on the significance of 
shame to the self and particularly to early narcissistic developments with its roots in 
an intersubjective field. He identifies two primary personality types, namely the 
egotistical (where shame is absent) and dissociated (where shame is engulfing). He 
further postulated that shame, when used as a defence against feelings of vulnerability 
or devaluation, may instigate the creation of a grandiose, haughty narcissism, and 
further aids in creating a “splitting off” of such grandiosity from the self’s own 
awareness. Kinston (1983), considering shame from within an object-relations model, 
similarly views it as an experience reflecting painful self-awareness and separate 
identity (or self-narcissism), in the face of difficulty relating to an Other.  
 
Helen Block Lewis (1971) has similarly emphasised the relationship between shame 
and narcissism highlighted by self psychological theory. She, like Kohut (1966, 1977) 
and Broucek (1991), views anger as a defensive, retaliative reaction to shame. 
She delineated the relationship between shame and anger in her notion of the shame-
rage spiral, where the victim of shame shifts the blame onto the Other, and their sense 
of self is “reactivated” through the expression of defensive anger. This in turn may 
activate retaliatory anger, resentment and blame from the Other back onto the shamed 
victim, resulting in further shaming, without any constructive resolution in sight. A 
related self-psychological view is that shame may result from self-object failure and 
that narcissistic rage is consequently turned against the offending object in an attempt 
to purge the shame (Kohut, 1966, 1977). Thus, shame is framed as “as individual 
vulnerability that interacts with dyadic disorganisation and alienation, resulting in a 
mutual persistent cycle of shame and humiliation, coupled with guilt” (Buchbinder, & 
Eisikovitz, 2003, p. 357).  
 
Like Freud, who equated shame with sexuality, Lewis poses that shame-prone people 
are likely to be women, prone to depression and “field dependant” – or more prone to 
individual concern about feedback from the surrounding environment. Guilt, she 
suggests, is tied to activity, masculinity and field independence. Examining shame 
from a phenomenological perspective, she described a split in self-functioning in 
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which the self is both agent and object of observation and disapproval, further 
locating shame within an interpersonal field and highlighting the role of 
objectification in shame experiences. Her conceptualisation of shame is closely in line 
with that of Freud’s heavily gendered understanding of the affect, as she views shame 
as an intrinsically feminine experience, particularly as it relates to the objectified, 
gendered body.  
 
Gender, shame and sexuality 
Much psychoanalytic theory links shame to feminine passivity and sexuality. More 
specifically, secondary shame in women is seen to produce passivity, secretiveness 
and a predominantly pre-oedipal cast to their psyche as a result of prolonged and 
complex attachment to the mother (Morrison, 1989). Dianne (2008), for example, 
argues that bodily-based narcissistic injury and a sense of shame is a response to 
Oedipal longings. Through Oedipal defeat, “a female sense of inadequacy and shame 
may be internalised and accepted as part of one’s identity, in contrast to the male 
phallic-omnipotent trajectory” (p. 73). Anthony (1981, as cited in Morrison, 1989) has 
suggested that the “identity theme” imprinted in the young girl is one of shame, 
leading to accompanying states of paranoia, depression, rage and envy. 
Psychodynamic theory thus views the female representation of the self as lacking in 
both bodily and psychic integrity, with the result that sexuality and aggression is 
inhibited. Broucek (1991) views the envy accompanying shame as diverting attention 
from the meagre state of the self by focusing on the despised strength of the Other, 
and marks the idealised qualities towards which the self strives.  
 
According to Broucek (1991) shame is indeed intimately connected to sexuality and 
gender. For him, this has less to do with psychodynamic theories of penis envy, but is 
more specifically related to the historic objectification of women. Like Lewis, he 
highlights the role of objectification in the triggering of shame, arguing that shame is 
the experience of being objectified by the other whilst wanting to be related to in an 
intersubjective mode. In regarding the gender of shame, he quotes John Berger: 
 
Men look at women. Women watch themselves being looked at. This 
determines not only most relationships between men and women but also the 
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relation of women to themselves. The surveyor of women in herself is male; 
the surveyed, female. Thus she turns herself into an object 
(1977, as cited in Broucek 1991, pg. 121).  
 
Thus, for Broucek, the mediation of the Other is essential in the foundation of 
objective self-awareness. This sense of self, as constituted by the imagined 
perceptions of the Other, is the basis of our most profound identification with our 
body - “an awareness of oneself as an object for others and, through the mirroring of 
the observing others, taking oneself as an object of reflection” (p. 37). Shame arises 
out of the tension between the mutually incompatible subjective sense of self and 
feeling of self-objectification, and a feeling of having one’s self negated or 
expropriated by the Other. Women in particular are thus constructed as objects for the 
Other - what the Other sees and reacts to is the body and the behaviour of the body.  
 
Objectification of women’s bodies historically is thus intimately linked to issues of 
shame and self-esteem. Objectification theory posits that the tendency to view the self 
as an object to be viewed by the other and subsequently evaluated by others’ affects 
female, but not male, subjective well-being (Grabe, 2007, Mercurio, 2008). This 
bodily shame expresses a basic conflict which threatens to obstruct a coherent sense 
of self by a severing of the body-mind relationship, what Lombardi (2007) refers to as 
a tendency towards the obliteration of the body. For example, there is a growing 
amount of evidence suggesting that body shame among women is one mediating 
factor in the relation between self-objectification and eating disorder symptomatology 
(Mercurio, 2007) depression (Grabe, 2007) and overall mental well-being, self-esteem 
and satisfaction with life (Mercurio, 2008).  
 
Lindisfarne (1998) writes on systems of honour and shame from an anthropological 
perspective, focusing on narratives of competition between dominant men and the 
passive subordination of women which exist cross-culturally. For her, “gendered 
difference, honour and shame are located in a quasi-physical attribute – female 
chastity or modesty, the virgin’s unbroken hymen – which is then treated as a thing 
and ranked and valued along with other commodities” (p. 248). She argues that 
abstract ideals of feminine purity (virginity and chastity) create in women an 
internalised ideal-self representation, upheld by the constant social threat of shame.  
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Tangney and Dearing (2002) similarly highlight that the “hotpoints for shame center 
on … two conflicting sexual ideals – the chaste, pure, virginal bride in white versus 
the voluptuous sex kitten” (p. 166), and posit that no aspect of our self has been so 
dysfunctionally shamed as much as our sexuality. Feminine shame, from this 
perspective, is intrinsically linked to ideals of embodied feminine sexuality.  
 
In her book, Managing the Monstrous Feminine, Ussher (2006) explores shame 
surrounding the feminine body as it relates specifically to the bodily functions of 
menstruation, pregnancy and menopause. For her, the loss of voice and power 
experienced by adolescent girls as they negotiate their changing feminine identities is 
embedded in their experiences of the fecund body, its signs of seepage and sexuality 
marking them as different and inevitably inducing shame:  
 
The positioning of the body as potentially polluted, or as sexually threatening, 
which underpins the practise of a post-menarchal gendered segregation, can be 
internalised as shame and disgust … the fecund female body as a sign of 
sexual temptation or taboo is reinforced, and the young women positioned as a 
sexual object – both desirable and threatening – a position she will occupy for 
the rest of her reproductive life (p. 22).   
 
“Menstruation is thus viewed as a sign of pollution, a source of debilitation and a 
danger leading to psychiatric illness (pre-menstrual tension), criminality and violence. 
It positions the female reproductive body as abject, deficient and diseased – a process 
inevitably inducing much shame and disgust most significantly among women 
themselves (Ussher, 2006). Brison (1997) similarly points to the reason for the 
historic denigration of women’s bodies, “historically presented as the antithesis to 
reason” (p. 15) as underlined by the lack of intellectual control of feminine bodily 
functions.   
 
Control of the female body and of feminine sexuality has been institutionalised in 
social and religious forms throughout history and across cultures, often involving the 
shaming of female sexuality and appearance. Davis (1996) similarly examines how 
contemporary feminine beauty systems and corresponding cultural discourses and 
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practises inferiorise the female body through the construction of unobtainable ideals 
from which the majority of female bodies fall (shamingly) short.  
 
Furthermore, the appraisal of bodily beauty aesthetics is embedded in a racialised 
hierarchy which informs judgments of beauty, femininity and desirability, whiteness 
signifying what Butler (2003) terms the regulative ideal of the racial matrix. 
Mama (1995) argues that: 
 
The content of “attractiveness” is invariably racialised, indicating that many 
black women’s early experience of their femininity is structured by the racist 
aesthetics which derive from colonial-integrationist discourses … (p. 150) 
 
Speaking to the shame associated with racialised identity formation, Tate (2007) 
demonstrates how “dark skin and natural afro-hair are central in the politics of 
visibility, inclusion and exclusion within black anti-racist aesthetics” (p. 300). She 
draws on conversations among “mixed race” women to explore the themes of shame 
which arise as they attempt to construct their racialised identities, significantly 
influenced by using whiteness as a yardstick for beauty. She argues that white 
concepts of beauty are inextricably linked to notions of sexual purity, delicacy and 
modesty, whereas the bodies of black women embodied a form of animal sensuality, 
as evident in the exhibition of Sara Baartman (Crais, & Scully, 2009). Erasmus (1997) 
similarly explores the politicisation of black hair in particular by class, gender and 
race, and the shame associated with having kinky hair. She argues that the racial 
hierarchies and values of colonialism have left a deep mark on the conceptions of 
beauty in South Africa.  
 
Much of the literature therefore speaks to the shame relating to an objectified, 
racialised and gendered body, and the way in which it directs attention to negative 
experiences of both the appearance of the body, as well as bodily functions (Gilbert, 
2002). Body shame is here defined as the self experiencing internalised negative 
views about the body due to a differentiation from society’s representation of an ideal 
body image (Pasillas, 2008). Despite the fact that shame of the body is a fundamental 
human experience affecting both genders, much of the literature clearly relates it more 
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specifically to a feminine subjectivity where the body is positioned as inferior, unruly 
and an indication of marked difference or deficiency (Ussher, 2006).” 
 
Shame therefore acts as socially shared information about one’s (lowered) position in 
the community. This is the reason, Gilbert (1997, 1998, 2002) suggests, that sexual 
abuse may elicit such intense feelings in women of self-disgust and “self” as violated, 
spoiled and damaged. Many theorists (Kaufman, 1989, Lee, Scragg and Turner, 2001; 
Leskela, Dieperink, & Thuras, 2002; Wilson, Drozdek, & Turkovic, 2006) have 
similarly highlighted the pivotal role of shame in sexual abuse symptomatology. The 
shame of rape, its connection to the shame of the feminine body and the emotional 
processing of the event as well as the subsequent influence on schematic 
representations of self and others will now be considered.   
 
The shame of sexual abuse 
Rape activates intense inner states of powerlessness, bodily violation and humiliation 
(Kaufman, 1989), disempowering the survivor and breaching the intimacy barrier 
(Lee, Scragg, & Turner, 2001). It is this damage to the self, argues Herman (1992), 
which lies at the heart of trauma; the autonomy of the survivor is violated at the level 
of basic bodily integrity and the construction of self that is formed and sustained in 
relation to others is shattered. Thus survivors’ subjectivities are reconstructed as 
fragmentary, inconsistent and contradictory (Gavey, 2005). The experience of being 
raped, the process of making sense of the trauma as well as the experience of 
revealing having been raped to others, significantly impacts both the survivor’s 
internal identity as well as the self’s social identity – in other words how the survivor 
is viewed in relation to the other (Lee, Scragg, & Turner, 2001). Survivors frequently 
remark that they are not the same person that they were before (Brison, 1997).  
 
Shame therefore lies at the heart of the traumatic experience of rape – it is the 
experience of the body being exposed as inherently damaged or defiled and the 
consequent disconnection of the self from society. Butler (2003), for example, has 
marked the body as the stage on which traumatic disconnection unfolds. She 
constitutes the body as a public phenomenon situated squarely in the social sphere, the 
site of abuse and political oppression reflecting our social identities: 
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Each of us is constituted politically in part by virtue of the social vulnerability 
of our bodies – as a site of desire and of physical vulnerability, as a site of a 
publicity at once assertive and exposed. Loss and vulnerability seem to follow 
from our being socially constituted bodies, attached to others, at risk of losing 
those attachments, exposed to others, at risk of violence by virtue of that 
exposure…the body implies mortality, vulnerability, agency: the skin and 
flesh expose us to the gaze of others, and also to touch and to violence (p. 10). 
 
Butler here is not referring directly to the affect of shame. However, her allusion to 
the exposure of the self to the Other, manifested in the body, speaks directly to 
processes underlying the shame following violence and bodily abuse.      
 
Much of the literature considering the shame of traumatic events marks the significant 
distinction between shame and humiliation. Broucek (1991), Gilbert (1989) Lee, 
Scragg and Turner, (2001) and Morrison (1989), among others, argue that humiliation 
arises from experiences where the individual has been ridiculed and disempowered, 
but does not assume any responsibility for the act. In the presence of humiliation, 
there must be someone who humiliates and who is to blame for the damage done. 
Humiliation, therefore, “represents the strong experience of shame reflecting severe 
external shaming or shame anxiety at the hands of a highly cathected object or 
significant other” (Morrison, 1989, p. 15).  
 
The distinction between the externalising attributional processes involved in 
humiliation and the self-attributing processes involved in shame is crucial to consider 
in the context of post-rape recovery. However, Lee, Scragg and Turner (2001) argue 
that shame and humiliation of the rape survivor are often present together and overlap 
in complex ways. They argue that a woman who has been raped may find the 
experience humiliating, but might not necessarily blame herself. Nevertheless, a sense 
of external shame may develop through the process of revealing the experience to 
others, in whose eyes she believes she is devalued. From that, she may develop a 
sense of internal shame to the extent that the rape has now scarred or damaged her. 
The result is the rape survivor harbouring feelings of injustice and desires for revenge. 
Herman (1992) similarly outlines the revenge fantasies of the rape survivor, in which 
the imagined roles of the perpetrator and the survivor are reversed. This, she argues, is 
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an attempt of the rape survivor to achieve some form of catharsis through the 
alleviation of her shame, and to restore her own sense of power.  
 
Rosenbaum and Varvin (2007) concur with much of the literature on the shaming 
experience of rape which connects it with feelings of helplessness, insecurity, anxiety, 
loss of basic trust and fragmentation of perspective of one’s own life. They view the 
recovery from trauma as relating to the survivor’s ability to regulate strong negative 
emotions such as shame in relation to others, and the activation of internal good and 
empathic object relations, a perspective which speaks to Kohutian views on the 
importance of self-objects in overcoming shame. The authors further emphasise the 
power of trauma to split mind, body and social relations; a severance of the self from 
the Other which is referred to in much of the literature as being fundamental to the 
experience of shame (Kaufman, 1989, Morrison, 1983, 1989).   
 
A large body of literature exists which suggests that shame, and the accompanying 
construction of a damaged sense of self, may therefore play a substantial role in 
linking the traumatic event to traumatic symptoms, strongly mediated through 
negative attributional cognitive processing (Andrews, Brewin, Rose, & Kirk, 2000; 
Feiring, Taska, & Lewis, 2002; Lee, Scragg, & Turner, 2001; Reyes, 1999). Lee, 
Scragg and Turner (2001) posit that the shame of trauma comes through two primary 
channels: trauma may confirm underlying negative beliefs about the self, or 
disconfirm positive self-beliefs. Thus, the pathogenic nature of post-traumatic shame 
is inextricably linked to self-attributional processes and its impact on the identity and 
self-structure of the survivor (Wilson, Drozdek, & Turkovic, 2006). Indeed, Janoff-
Bulman’s (1979) distinction between the characterological and behavioural self-blame 
of trauma survivors does not fall far from many of the theories discussed above which 
distinguish shame (predominantly characterological) from guilt (predominantly 
behavioural). Given the fragmentary, alienating nature of shame, it is not surprising 
that shame-proneness has been found to correlate positively with post-traumatic stress 
symptoms whereas guilt prone-ness has not (Leskela, Dieperink, & Thuras, 2002).  
 
In a further delineation of the role of shame and cognitive appraisal systems in post-
traumatic symptomatology, Reyes (1999) examines the role of shame-proneness, 
attachment anxiety and rejection sensitivity as interpersonal processing variables 
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which may mediate the impact of traumatic events. Interpersonal traumatic events, 
such as sexual abuse, were strongly correlated with higher rejection sensitivity and 
lower model of self scores, indicating a severe fragmentation of the survivor’s self 
identity. Sexual abuse syndromes are therefore profoundly coloured by intense shame 
and humiliation, and the accompanying reactions of fear, distress, envy and rage.  
 
Kaufman (1989) further outlines the pervasive nature of shame in the context of rape 
by outlining the shame-based relationship between perpetrator and survivor. Not only 
is the survivor most profoundly shamed herself by the experience, but is also further 
forced to accept the shame of the perpetrator, who Kaufman argues works through his 
own shame by defeating and humiliating his victim. Thus, men may learn to regulate 
their emotional experiences by using violence and aggression to terminate their 
experiences of the self-conscious and vulnerable emotions of shame, behaviour which 
is reinforced in part by masculine gender norms which inhibit the expression of shame 
(Jakupcak, Tull, & Roemer, 2005). Furthermore, the survivor’s sense of shame is 
enhanced by a sense of inadequacy surrounding the rape as representing her public 
failure in achieving intimate, romantic and familial ideals (Buchbinder, & Eisikovitz, 
2003).  
 
Rape and shame within the South African context 
While global and varied descriptions of rape commonly identify “shame” as 
something with which abused women often wrestle, the form of the affect may 
depend on the value systems of particular communities (Bennett, 2001). Much of the 
South African literature regarding the stigmatising and shaming effects of rape 
emphasises how the damage, devaluation and deviance of rape survivors is shaped by 
underlying contextually-specific patriarchal structures. Such structures are maintained 
through dominant discourses of the female sexual innocence of African women which 
position them as moral guardians for their respective cultural values and traditions 
(Kiguwa, 2004; Levett, 1994). Such discourses, informed by patriarchal notions of 
male domination and female submission (Boonzaier & De la Rey, 2004), inform the 
ostracism and shaming of women who are considered to be sexually impure. Maw, 
Womersley, & O’Sullivan (2008) similarly posit that culture specific gender role 
socialisation may be specifically related to post-rape behaviours, “which in turn 
influence post-rape disclosure experiences, the reactions from those in whom they 
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may confide and how survivors themselves narrate and make meaning of their 
experiences of sexual abuse” (p. 131). As such, reactions to rape survivors are located 
within a shame-based patriarchal structure which position survivors as defiled or 
morally inferior.  
 
Wood (2005) highlights the shame of the emasculated African male within this 
system, linking high levels of sexual violence to patriarchal gender ideologies and to a 
“crisis of masculinity” in a context where working-class African men have long been 
marginalized. He examines prevailing gendered discourses which dictate that men can 
and should discipline women’s “transgressive” behaviour, sub-cultural issues 
pertaining to the urban tsotsi phenomenon, the rural practice of ukuthwala (bride 
capture), young working-class Africans’ experiences of marginalization, and the 
complex links between political economy and violence in this setting. He concludes 
by suggesting that the structural violence of both colonial and apartheid South Africa 
often comes to be reflected in the expression of everyday violence and rage leading to 
the sexual abuse of women.  
 
According to Posel (2005a, 2005b), the public eruption of anger and anxiety 
surrounding sexual violence characterising post-apartheid South Africa has less to do 
with a deeper understanding of rape as seen within a framework of broader patriarchal 
ideologies, but more to do with a “scandal of manhood” (2005a, p. 248). As such, the 
outrage surrounding the high levels of sexual violence in the country continues to be 
located within the same patriarchal structures which significantly inform its high 
prevalence. She argues that the public shame of rape in South Africa has been largely 
based on a perceived inability to control male rapists, playing to fears surrounding the 
moral norms of a developing democracy and distracting attention from a feminist 
understanding of the experiences of the female survivors themselves. As a result, the 
attitudes of the police, the medical establishment and the criminal justice system 
continue to reflect a deeply shaming undercurrent to reactions to rape survivors, 
contributing to what is referred to in the literature as “secondary traumatisation” 
(Artz, 1999; Koss, 2000; Pithey, 2008).  
 
Motsei (2007) similarly argues that rape survivors are shamed by a deeply entrenched, 
negative social stigma surrounding womanhood, sex and sexual violence. She posits 
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that rape survivors in South Africa must deal with the often victim-blaming attitude of 
the criminal justice system - they must prove that they are not of loose moral 
character and that they did everything in their power to fight back. Thus, the very act 
of having to report being raped itself may lead to the further shaming experience of 
the survivor having to present her ordeal to the police, and in some cases in court, in a 
rational and logical manner.  Confronted by a South African context informed by 
particular religious, traditional, political, legal and economic systems, women have 
had to accept being deeply shamed by “something wrong in their drawers” (p. 23) and 
enduring the accompanying scorn, ridicule and abandonment so often a consequence 
of having been raped.  
 
“A study conducted by Steyn and Steyn (2008) reveals that the majority of rape 
survivors in the country are not reporting their rape incidences to the South African 
Police Service due to fear of being revictimised, a fear assumed to be largely 
mediated through feelings of shame. Narratives of the rape survivors’ interviewed 
were significantly coloured by themes of police displaying an uncaring attitude, being 
intimidating and uncommunicative, and the consequent anxiety, shame and distrust 
felt by the survivors.  It was found that most of the survivors interviewed by rape 
counsellors in this study believed that the police displayed an unsympathetic attitude 
towards them, and that they would be hesitant to seek assistance from the police in 
future as a consequence.   
 
A recent South African publication, entitled “Should We Consent? Rape Law Reform 
in South Africa edited by Artz and Smythe (2008) investigates the effect of the 
recently passed amendment to the Sexual Offences Bill, which largely highlights the 
positive steps this legal reform has made towards shifting the understanding of rape 
and the treatment of survivors within the criminal justice system. In this book, Naylor 
(2008) argues that legal responses to rape in South Africa have historically been 
characterised by “protecting the interests of society in avoiding unchaste behaviour, 
rather than protecting the interests of rape victims, with patriarchal societies 
criminalising rape to protect property rights of men over women” (p. 25). She thus 
highlights that South African institutions dealing with rape survivors have neglected 
to view the abuse within the context of the rights of all women to dignity, autonomy, 
bodily integrity and security of the person. Instead, Naylor concurs with Posel (2005a, 
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2005b) in suggesting that the problem of rape continues to be viewed from a 
decidedly patriarchal perspective, with rape understood to be the problem of one man 
having violated the property of another man. Naylor argues that the feminist struggle 
to shift societal responses to rape survivors needs to be taken at the level of legal 
reform, “the very site that has historically treated sexual assault victims with 
indifference, suspicion and, at times, hostility” (p. 50).  
 
Furthermore, Schwikkard (2008) argues that much of the historic embodiment of 
misogyny in the South African judicial system leading the survivor to being shamed, 
lies in the rules of evidence applicable to rape trials. She provides as an example the 
historic use of a rape survivor’s previous sexual history being used as evidence in 
court, which served to demean women and thus contribute to secondary victimisation. 
Similarly, when the rape survivor’s counselling records are disclosed to the defence, a 
common South African practice, “feelings of revictimisation are experienced, 
reinforcing the experience of powerlessness and invasion felt at the time of the sexual 
offence” (Pithey, 2008, p 100). In brief, much legal reform is beginning to, and needs 
to continue to, take place in order to address the issue of secondary victimisation 
among rape survivors in order to alleviate much of the shame many experience as 
they enter the criminal justice system.”  
 
The pervasive threat of contracting HIV after a sexual encounter adds a further 
dimension to the shame of the South African rape survivor. The South African 
context is characterised by an unrivalled rape pandemic as well as having one of the 
highest HIV infection rates in the world. It is therefore unsurprising that there have 
been attempts to link the two pandemics conceptually, mediated by the myths and 
traditional beliefs surrounding female sexuality and its relationship to the virus 
(Chisala, 2008; Motsei, 2007). According to Tangney and Dearing (2002), “our 
almost innate vulnerability to shame around sex is further compounded by the stigma 
of the disease and then made even more profound by concerns of being judged as 
sinful, morally depraved or irresponsible” (p. 168). As Kaufman (1989) notes, 
“shame activated by AIDS itself is further magnified by fear, humiliation, disgust, 
and rage activated by societal response” (p. 50). As a result, women identified as 
having been raped, or having been identified as infected with the virus, have been 
Un
ive
rsi
ty
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
“shunned, abandoned, isolated, expelled and even killed by horrified neighbours and 
kin” (Chisala, 2007, p. 70). 
 
The rape survivor’s profound shame lies not only in her experience of the humiliating 
and degrading event itself, but in the subsequent appraisal processes undertaken by 
herself and others in an attempt to make sense of the event. It fragments the core of 
her gendered, embodied identity, which is itself situated within a relation context from 
which she finds herself severed. Next to children, black women in South Africa are 
most vulnerable to ongoing traumatisation on a number of economic, physical and 
psychological levels, and are also the victims of the majority of rapes reported in the 
country (Maw, Womersley, & O’Sullivan, 2008). Therefore, within the South African 
context, the shaming experiences of “violation, helplessness and betrayal” (Kaufman, 
1989, p. 124) accompanying the notoriously high levels of gender-based violence in 
the country is inextricably linked to what Kiguwa (2004) terms the “triple oppression 
of many black South African women…oppressed in terms of race, class and gender” 
(p. 239).  
 
Within this context, it is impossible to consider the shame of the gendered, sexual 
body without linking it to the shame inherent in racialised identities, which 
themselves are deeply enmeshed in a complex matrix binding gender, class and socio-
economic status. In this space, as Harris (2000) argues, “one must attend to the 
intersections of race with class and privilege, the particular arenas in which race and 
gender cohere and fracture, the frighteningly seamless enmeshment of constructions 
of race in silence, in procedural memory, in the unconscious” (p. 655).  
 
Shame and racialised identities in the South African context  
Swartz (2007) argues that the assumption of a gendered identity within the South 
African context in particular is “inseparable from the conscious and unconscious 
habitation of a racialised identity…met with fear or competitiveness, idealisation or 
denigration, joyful curiosity or withdrawal” (p. 361). She posits that class, racial and 
gender divides, deeply entrenched by our Apartheid history, continue to shape the 
negotiation of our identities and affect our capacity to engage freely with the 
exploration of unconscious communication. This means us necessarily having to 
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grapple with shame inherent in our differences, being Other and Othering, often a 
traumatic exchange in itself.  
 
“Within the South African context, deeply marked by our colonial and apartheid 
history, the salience of our bodily, racialised identity is significantly marked by the 
associated implications of privilege, class and possibility. As Miles (1997) says of 
race and sex: “they are inextricably bound up with each other as signifiers that seep 
through the constraining boundaries of rationality by virtue of evoking responses 
which are more visceral than rational” (p. 138).  The black body bears the mark of the 
oppressed, is compared to privileged whiteness and inevitably found to be lacking 
(Robins, 1998). As such, “blacks will always be the numerical majority weighed 
down by the psychology of suffering minorities” (Ndebele, 1998, p. 27). The white 
body, on the other hand, bears the mark of privilege, of power and of access to 
resources, a symbol of the despised oppressor bearing the guilty mark of Cain “arising 
from involuntary forced association with the corrupt apartheid regime” (Straker, 
2004a, p. 406). This hierarchy of authority is a source of shame for both the historic 
oppressor and the oppressed, inevitably bound up within Apartheid’s categories and 
constructions and speaking straight to the heart of issues surrounding identity through 
historic representation. As Suchet (2004) posits, “we all carry the haunting presence 
of shame and guilt as the heritage of our history, soaked as it is in the trauma of 
oppression” (p. 430).  
 
As Suchet (2004) demonstrates in her re-telling of her own relational encounters with 
race in the intersubjective, “it is not simply that shame is located in the subjective 
experience of being racialized as one of dark colour, but that shame pervaded my 
experience of being of white colour” (p. 431). Straker (2004a) posits that many white 
South Africans have used the Other to deal with the shame of having to confront a de-
idealised whiteness, patronizingly and paternalistically working in the interests of the 
Other who is “used as object to empower the white self in its group identification, in 
order to cover up its lack…the Other is used as a selfobject in a particular way to 
shore up a wounded sense of self” (p. 415). Cushman (2000) agrees with Straker that 
the shame surrounding white identity is inevitably linked to a sense of betrayal, or in 
other words of not being able to meet an ideal standard of whiteness: “whiteness is 
first and foremost a political signifier about the socioeconomic power that in actuality 
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few people possess: therefore most whites are in the position of trying to pass” (p. 
613). Thus, the anti-racist efforts of white people can contain, disguise and perpetuate 
subtle forms of racism (Altman, 2004; Straker, 2004a), where “the Other is not merely 
seen as an equal, but for various complex reasons is idealized” (Straker, 2004b, p. 
451).  
 
Many white feminist researchers like myself are therefore faced with the task of 
absorbing and accepting the reality of our historical connection to racist ancestry, a 
process tainted with shame. Bennett, and Friedman (1997), for example, question the 
defensiveness of many white feminist researchers when faced with black women’s 
challenges. They note the perceived disconnection of many white women’s self 
identity from their social identity. In such a context, the subjective “I” is tentatively 
positioned as separate from the visible “I” reflecting group identity. Might this be 
viewed as an attempt for white feminist researchers to disconnect ourselves from the 
shame of our communal identities, from the shame of knowing that we “are not 
hungry because many black people are starving” (Bennet, & Friedman, 1997, p. 51)?  
 
In the context of white women researching gender-based violence among black 
women in South Africa, there is an added dimension of shame which carries a 
particularly racialised and politicised dimension. As Burman and Chantler (2005) 
argue, any investigation of violence or abuse within oppressed communities “faces 
charges of fuelling racism by perpetuating widespread cultural stereotypes that these 
groups are more oppressive to women than the dominant culture” (p. 71). This 
dimension is further highlighted by Mama’s (1995) understanding of the role of 
psychological research in the “construction of African subjects as the objectified 
Other of the European imagination” (p. 18). Thus, shame may be situated in the 
relationship between the researcher and the researched in the form of both parties 
conscious of such stereotypes within this space. 
 
Shame cannot be separated from the complex matrix of gender, ethnicity and socio-
economic class informing our public identities, which are so boldly reflected through 
our bodies. Shame is located within the micro-level of daily encounters and continues 
to pervade and significantly inform the intersubjective space between our (gendered, 
racialised, classed, embodied) selves, and the Other.   
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 Shame in the intersubjective field 
 
Contemporary intersubjective theory views the shame of the self as contagious and 
often resonating with the shame of the Other (Hahn, 2000; Orange, 1995; Morrison, 
1983). Orange (1995) notes that even in the experiential world of shame, which feels 
so aversive and isolating, we are intricately involved in intersubjective systems. In 
such intersubjective shame systems,  
 
we feel deficient in comparison with the others, we feel we are failures in our 
own and others’ eyes, we feel so held up to critical scrutiny in our desperate 
misery that we want to sink into the ground and become invisible…worst of 
all, there is no hope of escape from the enclosure of this world except through 
the encounter with another with whom I must again enter worlds of shame  
(p. 7).  
 
The pain of shame, and the consequent fear of rejection and abandonment, effects 
both the self and the Other on multiple levels, and may result in the development of 
complex but predictable defence strategies (Hahn, 2000). Morrison (1983, 1989) 
argues that the shamed individual will polarise internal representations into devaluing 
and devalued introjects. In the first instance, a devaluing or shaming self-object is 
externalised through projection or projective identification, which could result in the 
experience of the Other as condemning and critical, justifying the self’s withdrawal or 
avoidance. Alternatively, the devalued self-object is perceived as defective or inferior, 
justifying the expression of feelings of contempt, rage and envy. Hahn (2000) posits 
that  
 
because the experience of shame involves the activation of devalued and 
devaluing internal representations, therapists may develop concordant or 
complementary countertransference identifications. These countertransference 
identifications are influenced further by the patient's primary reaction to 
shame, which includes withdrawal, attacks on self, avoidance, and attacks on 
others. Each of these reflects a habitual reaction to shame that is displayed in 
the patient-therapist relationship. (p. 10) 
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 The splitting of devaluing and devalued self-objects speaks to Hollway’s (1989) 
outlining of the relational defences used to defend against intolerable feelings, such as 
shame, which she bases on classically Kleinian defence mechanisms of splitting, 
introjection and projection. When individuals externalize or project devalued mental 
representations, they judge and condemn others for personal characteristics that they 
deny in themselves while feeling justified and occasionally self-righteous in their 
criticisms (Hahn, 2004). Mental representations retain their affectively charged and 
predominant visual qualities, and words are used to judge and belittle (Hahn, 2004, 
Lewis, 1971). Due to the psychic strength of such representations, the emotional 
qualities of relationships become more salient for the shamed self than verbal 
communication (Schore, 2003).  
 
It is therefore not only the primary affect of shame which needs to be considered in 
our interactions with the Other, but also what Kaufman (1989) refers to as defending 
scripts, or secondary reactions to shame. He outlines these scripts as being fear, rage 
or anger (which insulates the wounded self against further exposure, thereby acting as 
the self’s protective cover), contempt (contempt by one results in shame in the other 
which is then retaliated, distances the self from the other whilst elevating the self 
above the other), the transfer of blame (which recruits anger but directs it in an 
accusatory, fault-finding manner in order for the self to remain pure and free from 
culpability), humiliation (inducing a need to seek revenge), striving for perfection (the 
need to erase the blemish of shame), striving for power, internal withdrawal (or the 
reduction of exposure to avoid further shame), humour (which reduces negative affect 
and attenuates the self-consciousness and exposure inherent in shame in order for the 
self to gain command of the scene) and denial, the final line of defence should all 
other defending scripts fail.  
 
A large body of literature exists on manifestations of shame within the therapeutic 
relationship in particular, which speaks to the significant power imbalance dictating 
the nature of the relationship. As early as 1936, Horney (1936) was one of the first 
authors to consider the role of shame in negative transference reactions: “It has 
always hurt the patient to be dimly aware of flaws in his personality. But he feels 
humiliated if the analyst brings these flaws to his attention” (p. 36). Broucek (1991) 
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argues that it is the notion of transference and the asymmetrical nature of the 
therapist-client relationship which frequently induces shame within the therapeutic 
relationship, both on the part of the client as well as for the therapist.  
 
Foucault, speaking to the power imbalance inherent in this relational asymmetry, 
refers to the use of confessional technology by therapists as reifing the power 
dynamics which subject the client to the scrutiny of disciplinary surveillance 
(Foucault, 1982; Hook, 2004). Confession is an act of discipline; clients are “liberated” 
at the cost of rendering their self-knowledge dangerously dependant on the categories 
and assumptions of the other (Hengehold). Such an understanding of the power 
dynamics underlying the therapist-client research has propelled the emotional turn in 
feminist reflexive practise which emphasises the dangerously fine line between care 
and control (Burman, 2006). As Ikonen, Echardt and Echardt (1993) note, “the mere 
admission of the need for help may be unbearably humiliating (p. 120).  This situation 
is a potential source of shame for both the client (who may feel rejected at the lack of 
reciprocity) and for the therapist (who may feel that she has seduced the client into 
self-disclosure without being able to reciprocate).   
 
This avoidance of self-exposure is thus an avoidance of the shame experience, but 
equally a source of shame for the therapist herself (Lewis, 1971) who is similarly 
confined to her own subjectivity. Whilst the client is compelled to self-disclose (with 
varying degrees of willingness and compliance), the therapist must shun her2 own 
self-disclosure and remain an essentially invulnerable symbol (Broucek, 1991). The 
literature on shame within this relationship highlights the fact that the assumption that 
the therapist is a paragon of mental health can be a further source of shame for the 
therapist not having a sense of mastery or control, inducing chronic feelings of 
ignorance, confusion and inadequacy (Broucek, 1991, Tangney & Dearing, 2002). A 
further source of shame highlighted by Tangney and Dearing (2002) which relates 
strongly to the idealised self-image of the therapist lies in the therapist’s own counter-
transference reactions to client in cases where they feel anything less than genuine 
concern, kindness and interest towards them. Shame results from such reactions to the 
                                                 
2 2 I have chosen for simplicity’s sake to use the personal pronouns “she” and “her” as opposed to “she 
or he” and “his or hers.” 
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client serving as an “anathema to the competent and compassionate self-image of 
most therapists” (Hahn, 2000, p. 10). 
 
It is clear that both the analyst’s and the client’s individual shame, as well as the 
shame which they co-construct within the intersubjective space, play an integral part 
of the therapeutic process. I would suggest that many parallels can be drawn between 
that particular relationship and the relationship between researcher and research 
participants in the case of much psychological research, and in particular research 
based on the conduction of open-ended interview schedules. Researchers may be 
similarly placed in a vulnerable, shaming position, shaped in many ways by the same 
socially-constructed expectations. The researcher is separated from the everyday 
practise being studied by the social position of researcher and thus positioned in a 
more distant relationship to the practise being researched (Gray, 2008). Thus, as 
professionals, they are not expected to self-disclose. 
 
Research participants, however, are positioned as “subjects” – both in the very 
concrete sense of the term as it is used semantically, but similarly as the subject of the 
researcher’s scrutiny or, from a Foucauldean perspective, “subject to someone else’s 
control and dependence” (Foucault, 1982, p. 781). As they expose themselves 
emotionally, the pain of this inequality represents an inevitably one-sided, demeaning 
experience (Appelbaum, & Stein, 2009). This is no more pertinent than within the 
South African research context, which continues to be marked by power differentials 
in terms of race, gender and class. Clark (2004), for example, has used her interviews 
with rural women in South Africa to demonstrate the inevitably colonial associations 
of researching black women in this space.  
 
The analysis presented below tracks the shame which arose in such a research context, 
demonstrating how shame neither belongs exclusively to the self or the other, but is 
unavoidably generated, exacerbated and maintained within the relational, 
intersubjective field. A dialogical self exists only among relationships and cultures, 
and only within this does a shame system exist, pervading entire experiential worlds 
(Stolorow & Atwood, 1992). As such, shame is located within the analysis not as a 
product of isolated mechanisms, but as forming at the interface of reciprocally 
interacting, yet necessarily confining, subjectivities.  
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RESEARCH DESIGN/METHOD 
 
Data collection 
Presented below is a case study of a particular researcher-researched relationship 
within the context of qualitative, feminist research in South Africa. It is an analysis of 
the dialogue between myself and Maria, which formed part of a study conducted by 
myself in order to research the psychological impact of rape in survivors within 72 
hours of the event. Our meeting took place at the Thuthuzela Care Centre in the 
Western Cape, which provides forensic, clinical and counselling support for survivors 
of rape – the site of my research. I interviewed Maria using a semi-structured 
interview schedule. Our conversation was guided by broad, open-ended questions 
aimed at eliciting a narrative of her experience of the event, including the details of 
the rape itself, her emotional reaction and her feelings towards the institutions who 
were dealing with the rape. After the interview, I took detailed notes of my own 
thoughts and feelings surrounding the interview which were recorded in a journal, an 
attitude of what Gergen and Gergen (1991) term reflexivity, or critical reflection on 
personal experience as playing an important role in the research process (Boonzaier & 
de la Rey, 2004, Finch, 1993; Reinharz, 1992). The interview itself was tape-recorded 
and transcribed verbatim, which serves as the primary source of data for this analysis.  
 
The transcript of this dialogue has been analysed as part of this original research, with 
the focus being on an analysis of the dominant discourses which shaped the narratives 
of the survivors I interviewed. However, I have subsequently become aware of the 
pivotal role of shame, which profoundly coloured the exchange between us. I 
therefore present this interaction as a case study in order to delineate the various 
manifestations of shame which arose in the intersubjective space between us.  
 
Case Study Methodology 
Atwood and Stolorow (1993, 1984) note that the case study method has a long and 
distinguished history. They highlight the various ways in which such an analysis 
embeds itself so comfortably within intersubjective theory. One of the main reasons 
for this is that the case study is personalistic and phenomenological – focussing on the 
context of the individual’s world which is located along a specific temporal dimension 
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of the here-and-now.  Thus, the intersubjective paradigm of mutual influence and 
reciprocity has profound implications for this particular case study: 
 
The varied patterns of meaning that emerge in … research are brought to light 
within a specific psychological field located at the point of two subjectivities. 
Because the dimensions and boundaries of this field are intersubjective in 
nature, the interpretive conclusions of every case study must, in a very 
profound sense, be understood as relative to the intersubjective context of their 
origin (Atwood & Stolorow, 1984, p. 6)  
 
Therefore, because the case study method focuses on providing a rich and context-
specific description of individuals, it allows for a detailed analysis and the practical 
application of theory to a specific meeting in time of individuals who together co-
construct a unique, mutually influenced intersubjective space.  
 
Theoretical orientation 
In keeping with an understanding of the relational nature of shame, my analysis of the 
interaction between myself and Maria was guided by intersubjectivity theory, 
characterised by an awareness of the co-constructed nature of the relationship 
(Jaenicke, 2008). My own theorising on the relationship from a relational or 
intersubjective paradigm has been strongly shaped by the work of Orange, Stolorow 
and Atwood in particular, who espouse a dyadic relational perspective on interactions 
between the self and the Other which debunks the myths of neutrality, objectivity and 
uncontaminated transference in the relational space (Atwood, Orange and Stolorow, 
2002; Orange, Atwood, & Stolorow, 1997; Stolorow, Atwood & Orange, 1999). Their 
intersubjective systems theory breaks away from what they term a Cartesian, isolated-
mind philosophy to an understanding of the intersubjective space which is irrefutably 
contextual. Psychological phenomena are thus not viewed as products of isolated 
intrapsychic mechanisms, but crystallize from within a matrix of intersubjective 
relatedness.  
 
Altman’s (2000; 2004) analysis of race, class and culture within an intersubjective 
dyad offers a unique contribution to this paradigm. He adopts a “three person field 
theory” where the “third person” represents the socio-political context of both the self 
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and the Other. He therefore “locates the dialectism between individuality and 
culturality in the unarticulated behaviour that occurs in socially constructed role 
relationships” (Bodnar, 2004, p.584). In this paradigm, the meeting between myself 
and Maria in the highly contextualised intersubjective space is viewed as a “dialogic 
attempt between two people together to understand one person’s organization of 
emotional experience by making sense together of their intersubjectively configured 
experience” (Orange, Atwood, & Stolorow, 1997, p. 5). For example, this includes a 
recognition that bearing witness to Maria’s trauma in the immediate aftermath of rape 
rendered me vulnerable to powerful and disturbing emotional experiences mediated 
through shame. As Orange (1995) notes, “witness is more than a self-object function, 
it is an intersubjective process of realisation that allows emergence of new kinds of 
self-experience” (p. 11).  
 
Buirski (2005) draws on Orange’s theories in suggesting that “in the intersubjective 
field constructed with the particular witness, the survivor and witness together further 
the unfolding, illumination and articulation of the meaning of the traumatic 
experience” (p. 109). Thus, self-knowledge too is regarded as being socially 
constructed (Walls, 2004). The approach posits that objective reality can never truly 
be known as “fact” but is in fact a subjective reality constructed within the interplay 
of subjectivities. Indeed, this begs the question: “Can a segment of an oppressed 
group rely on knowledge produced, researched and theorised by others, no matter how 
progressive they are?” (Nkululeko 1987, as cited in Motsei, 2007, p. 164).  
 
Similarly, intersubjective theory is characterised by an awareness that “racial, ethnic 
and religious differences present in the dyad are important and unavoidable contextual 
components that impact the relationship and engagement of participants” (Buirski, 
2005, p. 76). I draw significantly on Leary’s (2000) concept of racial enactments 
which she defines as “interactive sequences embodying the actualisation…of cultural 
attitudes towards race and racial difference” (p. 639) in order to further delineate the 
role of such enactments within the intersubjective field. In this relational paradigm, 
the various manifestations of self identity are similarly products of social construction. 
The self is not viewed as a discrete centre of action and experience, but is 
ontologically social (Walls, 2004). Buirski (2005), for example, highlights the 
impossibility of interaction without mutual influence, noting that the self’s racialised 
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and gendered identity is inevitably and unavoidably disclosed to the Other as 
observable features of the body.  
 
When borne in mind, this context of differences begs the question of “Otherness” 
within the intersubjective space. As Bartky (1997) asks “what does it mean, exactly, 
to be more “sensitive” to the Other?... Does greater sensitivity require perhaps a 
merging of self and Other? … Is a special affective repertoire necessary for the 
building of solidarities across lines of race and class that is not necessary when these 
lines are not crossed?” (p. 180). She uses the phenomenological terms “Mitwelt” 
(shared world) and Gefühlsansteckung (emotional infection) as a proposed attitude of 
“feeling with” as we enter into the intersubjective encounter with the Other. Analysis 
was therefore conducted with a consideration of the fact that both Maria and myself 
were emotionally infected with the shame which so pervaded the space we had 
created.  
 
Data analysis within an intersubjective paradigm also carries significant linguistic 
implications. A linguistic perspective on subjectivity relates to the expression of the 
self’s perspective in discourse, and the effect of that perspective in shaping the 
discourse (Finegan, 1995). As Kristeva (1989) writes, “discourse implies first the 
participation of the subject in his language through his speech, as an individual. Using 
the anonymous structure of la langue, the subject forms and transforms himself in the 
discourse he communicates to the other” (p. 11). Language structure and use is 
therefore integral in the expression of self and the self’s identity, the representation of 
perspective as well as in the formation and structuring of relational discourse. This 
awareness significantly shaped my own process of analysis.  
 
Data analysis was therefore characterised by a strong focus on the role of language in 
marking the sites of similarity and difference in our dynamic, fluid and shifting 
identities. It was furthermore conducted with a particularly feminist lens, 
characterised by a critical focus on issues of gender, gender relations and power 
which both constitute, and are reproduced in, social institutions (Gavey, 2005, Wood 
& Kroger, 2000). Consequently, the analysis was significantly informed by an 
awareness of the impact of gender inequities on women’s vulnerability to shame and 
the influence of intricately complex yet dominating power dynamics.  Such a 
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theoretical perspective necessitates a commitment to understanding the ways in which 
gender is a social production, formed, reproduced and modified within the 
intersubjective (Hollway, 1989; Mama, 1995) as well as a critical attention to 
positionality, reflexivity, the production of knowledge and the power relations that are 
inherent in research processes (Sultana, 2007).     
 
From this theoretical point of departure, I explore the shame that both Maria and I 
both carried, as well as the shame which was created and negotiated in the space 
between us – the transcript being viewed as the product of what was co-constructed 
by both of us (Parker, 2005) within a specific context. In this co-constructed space, 
my own theories and cultural traditions, or what intersubjective theorists term 
“organising principles”, as well as those of Maria, were “crucial in understanding the 
meanings and impasses that develop in the intersubjective field” (Stolorow, Orange, 
& Atwood, 2001, p. 472).   
 
In order to track the development of shame as it was co-constructed within this 
intersubjective field, the analysis follows the interaction from the beginning of the 
interview to the end. However, specific pieces of dialogue are highlighted as marking 
particularly salient moments where shame was activated and passed between the two 
of us. Following the example of Miller (1993), who demonstrates an inferential 
identification of shame themes in interview data, the selection of such moments was 
based on a triangulated model of data analysis dictating the tracking of the affect – 
namely based on the form of the conversation, the content of our dialogue as well as 
my own emotional memory of the event. 
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ANALYSIS 
 
The analysis offered here illustrates the various manifestations of shame which arose 
in the interaction between myself and a research participant, Maria. The case 
illustrates the effects of shame as it is mediated by my own identity as a 22 year old, 
Jewish, middle-class female researcher and Maria’s identity as a 32 year old female 
Coloured rape survivor living in the socially and economically oppressed Cape Flats. 
Our dialogue is testament to the psychic consequences of shame and the 
accompanying feelings of envy seen in the context of deprivation and powerlessness, 
as well as in the ubiquitous (and often unspeakable) presence of racial and gendered 
trauma (Harris, 2000).  
 
The first contact I had with Maria was in the waiting room of the Thuthuzela Care 
Centre, which forms part of G. F. Jooste Hospital in Mannenberg, Cape Town. She 
had been brought in by the police, had been seen by a doctor and was sitting in the 
waiting room. I approached her to ask whether she would be interested in taking part 
in my research by speaking to me about her feelings surrounding her experience of 
having been raped. At this stage, I was aware of having been overcome with an 
intense feeling of shame as I initiated contact. This shame was deeply connected to 
my own ideas of how I imagined Maria to be perceiving me at that moment and what 
it was that I was asking her to do. I began to doubt myself, to fear that I was 
perpetuating a form of exploitation in using her trauma to further assist in the success 
of my own privileged education. I considered the many questions which I believed I 
might have asked were I in her position, and which I was beginning to ask myself: 
Who was I to disturb her, to ask her to reveal her most private self as a favour to me, a 
young and inexperienced researcher? Maria agreed to my request by following me 
into the interview room without saying a word.   
 
As a result of the shame which I was experiencing, and a subsequent need to alleviate 
it through compensating for my own inadequacy in providing her with something 
beneficial, I immediately and somewhat apologetically emphasised the voluntary 
nature of the research, suggesting that many women who come to the centre find it 
difficult to talk about their experience, and that she did not have to talk to me if she 
did not want to.  
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 I began the conversation by telling her that,  
 
I know it might be difficult for you, and some of the things which we talk 
about might make you feel sad or upset. And that’s okay, we can take a break 
anytime you want. If you want to stop, just tell me. We can stop the interview. 
And, ummm, it’ll just be like a conversation between us. There’s no right or 
wrong. I just want to find out what’s happening with you and how you’re 
feeling. 
 
I felt myself to be forcing her to reveal a part of herself which may make her feel 
ashamed, “sad or upset,” and attempted to counteract my resultant shame by 
emphasising the degree of control she would have over the conversation. I was 
acutely aware of how distressing a retelling of the rape may be for her, of how 
ashamed and exposed she may already have been as a result of me knowing about the 
rape. In telling her that there’s “no right or wrong,” it is possible that I was trying to 
alleviate the shame related to me being able to construct my own interpretation of her 
experience, to pass judgement by subjecting her to the scrutiny of my own 
disciplinary surveillance (Hook, 2004). It was an attempt to distance myself from 
“other” authoritarian figures (in this case not only the police and the medical staff at 
the hospital, but the numerous white researchers attempting to represent the 
experiences of black women) who I imagined may have asked her to expose her 
experience of being raped. I imagined how such figures may have subsequently 
delivered some form of judgement in assessing her case from the perspective of their 
own pre-constructed categories.  
 
The shame I have placed in the intersubjective field thus resonated with my own 
feelings of shame derived from two primary sources. Firstly, at that moment my own 
shame was significantly informed by the discomfort I felt regarding my position as 
researcher; the discrepancy between the ideal self I have imagined I need to be, and 
the fear of being exposed as less-than. Secondly, an awareness of this position of 
authority brings with it the shame of being in power (reified quite physically by my 
white skin which immediately marked me as historic oppressor) who requires nothing 
short of Maria but to expose the experience of being raped to me.  By “just wanting to 
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find out what’s happening with you,” I attempted to extract myself from the 
exploitative position of authority and to offer Maria a more accepting and empathic 
space in recompense for this exploitation. My use of the word “just” indicated my 
attempt to minimise the difficulty of what it is that I was asking her to do, an attempt 
to reassure her that it would not be too taxing a task.   
 
Maria nodded in agreement and went on to express her anger and confusion at being 
raped: 
 
Now I’m feeling very angry. I feel so confused. I feel that there’s no hope. It’s 
almost like I’m trapped. I can’t get out. I feel like no one understands, nobody 
cares. I can’t trust even myself. Or even cry…I can’t even cry. I don’t know 
what to do. And the most important thing of all that I feel is that I don’t feel 
anything. I feel like nobody cares … I won’t even be able to look at myself 
and I’ve lost everything.  
 
Maria’s sense of “not being able to look at myself” speaks directly to the shame felt as 
a result of being raped by her husband, and the subsequent severance of her own sense 
of self from her social environment, a rupture of what Kaufman (1989, p. 22) terms 
the “interpersonal bridge” binding self and Other. This sense of social isolation is 
evident in her sense that “nobody cares.” She has “lost everything,” or in other words 
she has lost her connection to everything. The world is not to be trusted, and Maria 
“can’t even trust [herself].” Her words communicated a sense that the rape has taken 
away an acceptable form of self from her, and in its place stood a self which even she 
could not tolerate.   
 
At this stage of the interview, her feelings of rage dominated her narrative. She went 
on to tell me that she was so angry that she could “kill someone, really hurt someone.” 
She outlined the thoughts she had of pouring boiling water over her husband’s feet: 
“he would have gotten so much pain. And all his skins, all his bones would have 
hanged on him. But most of all he would have had pain...and I wanted him to feel that 
pain.”  
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Maria’s wish for her husband to “feel that pain” speaks to an expressed need to 
achieve some form of catharsis through the reversal of roles between herself and her 
husband, which may serve as a way for her to restore of a sense of power and control 
(Herman, 1992). Her words also suggest that her own sense of autonomy has been 
compromised not only by the abuse of her husband, but in the resultant feelings of 
rage which she feared may compromise her control to the point of being able to kill 
someone. Her shame in that instance appeared to be related to a sense of not being 
able to retain control of her own emotions, of being far from an ideal, stable self, as 
indicated in her subsequent words: 
 
There’s so much anger, I can’t even love my own … I’ve got a beautiful 
daughter. She’s at home and I can’t even love her. I feel a bit for her because 
I’m her mother and I care for her. A mother can never leave her child…and 
how could I just walk? How could a mother walk away from her child?  
 
Implicit in her statement that “a mother can never leave her child” is a sense of 
judgement, strongly informed by prevailing gendered discourses of what it is meant to 
be a good mother (Sederer, 1976). Maria’s shame of not being able to live up to this 
ideal standard of motherhood is evident, manifest in her initial hesitation to complete 
her sentence, namely the thought of not being able to love her own daughter. Her 
words suggest that the shame in admitting this to me is too much to be tolerated, 
rendering her thoughts somewhat inarticulable. The unspoken ideal self-
representation is thus a mother who would never walk away from her child, the shame 
arising out of the discrepancy between Maria as she is now, who has left her child 
with her husband, and “the image or concept of oneself as one would be if one had 
satisfied a specific ideal” (Schafer, 1967, p. 15, as cited in Morrison, 1989). Thus, her 
shame may be a response of the viewing experiencing self alone to internal need and 
failure, “the eye turned inward” (Morrison, 1989, p. 195).  
 
 Maria then began expressing her sense of helplessness and confusion at the time of 
the rape: “You can beg, you can scream but they will still hurt you. Nobody will help 
you. No person…but when I really wanted to, I couldn’t end it. But I have to get up 
from the floor and show no emotions, no feelings.” The assumption implicit in her 
statement is that any display of emotion is strongly equated with a feeling of 
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vulnerability and of being situated in a lower social position (“on the floor”). The rape 
has tainted her body as spoilt, compromising her social position in the eyes of the 
Other (Gilbert 1997, 1998, 2002) and has taken away her own sense of personal 
agency by placing her in a situation which rendered her powerless to act. Morrison 
(1989) suggests that the “searing” (p. 113) quality associated with descriptions of 
shameful experiences reflects a sense of helplessness in the face of an inability to alter 
the state of the compromised self.  
 
This feeling of unworthiness, of social undesirability, of helplessness leads to a 
shattering of the core self of the survivor (Herman, 1992), which may lead to a 
paralysing self-hatred, as illustrated in Maria’s subsequent words:  
 
I know I’m beautiful, I know myself. I’m someone who likes to look in 
people’s faces when I talk to them. I like to look in their eyes. But now I could 
never look in someone’s eyes. I could never look into my own eyes because 
I’m just lying to myself. I will never see that part of me again. Ever. I will 
never look another person in the eyes again.  
 
Maria’s words suggest that the rape has disconfirmed her previously held positive 
self-beliefs in her own beauty (Lee, Scragg and Turner, 2001), and has replaced this 
with a shame so paralysing that she is unable to look people in the eyes. Thus, Maria’s 
words could imply that she had internalised the perceived glare of the Other, an 
audience which so strongly exposes her shame that she herself is unable to look into 
her eyes, placing herself as both object and subject of observation (Lewis, 1971). As 
Morrison (1998) notes, “to feel shame, we do not need the presence of an actual 
shamer or a viewing audience; we need only those internal figures who have become 
part of who we are” (p. 16).  
 
Maria went on to say, “I’m in a corner, I can’t move. I don’t know how to get my life 
back in order again. I’m a cripple.” As Morrison (1989) suggests, “a lack of 
acceptance by self and others is…a central narcissistic quandary, related to the deeply 
felt shame of the narcissist” (p. 82). This quandary places the shamed self outside of 
known relational and contextual structures in the interpersonal field (Broucek, 1991), 
a significantly disabling position. At this point in the interview, I was aware of the 
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fact that Maria was not looking me in the eye, and that I too was feeling somewhat 
disabled by her narrative. My own shame resonated with hers. I was led by a strong 
desire not to put her any more into a corner, not to appear as yet another judging critic. 
I felt unable to respond to her shame in a way which was deservedly respectful and 
thus remained silent whilst she continued to recount her experiences. 
 
Maria went on to tell me the story of her first born child, who died on her third day of 
school at the age of six years old. She told me of how she has come to terms with this 
death, and how she has been blessed with another child: “Now God gave me another 
child, He gave me a second child. A Barbie child. That child is so perfect that when I 
cry, she wipes the tears away.” Here there is a striking association of perfection with 
Barbie – an icon which arguably celebrates the feminine ideal, both in terms of her 
(white) bodily perfection as well as the middle-class lifestyle she represents. The 
image of the perfect child reverberates with the projective phantasies of perfection 
and omnipotence seen as the underside of shame (Hollway, 1989), a defensive 
identification with the admired Other (Morrison, 1989).  
 
When she uttered these words, I couldn’t help but consider the significance of it being 
this “Barbie child” who was able to alleviate her pain. The allusion resonated with 
images of the many attempts by powerful white supremacists propelled by 
humanitarian ideals to “fix” Black and Coloured people (Cushman, 2000) and 
consequently brought the undeniability of my own whiteness and attempts at “helping” 
sharply into focus in my mind’s eye. Considering myself positioned as such from 
Maria’s perspective exacerbated my shame on two fundamental levels:  I become 
deeply aware of my own privileged position in relation to hers, and began to question 
whether my research would be of help to her. As a result, I found myself remaining 
silent whilst encouraging Maria to continue uninterrupted, imagining this to be a way 
of redressing the balance of power by allowing her to recount her narrative on her 
own terms.   
 
Maria spoke of her second child being “stronger than I am” – and the shame she felt 
in not being able to provide for her as she believes a mother should. She told me that 
if her child is so perfect, and so able to look after herself in the midst of the ongoing 
domestic conflict between herself and her husband, that there is something wrong 
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with her as a mother: “What did I do wrong? Where did I go wrong?”  There appears 
to have been a splitting of what is “good” –  Maria’s perfect child, from what is “bad” 
– Maria herself as a mother (Hollway, 1989). Her lengthy explanations as to why she 
had to leave her child at home and why the child had borne witness to such violence 
could be construed as an attempt to alleviate the shame she was feeling for having left 
her child. Therefore, it served as a defence against my perceived judgement of her 
competence as a mother, portrayed in her use of rhetorical questions which may have 
simultaneously served as an admission of “bad motherhood” in order to pre-empt my 
own judgement of her value as a mother, but which also demanded no answer from 
me. Hoping to indicate a lack of judgement on my part, I silently indicated to her to 
continue.  
 
As Maria recounted this distressing narrative, she began to cry. She went on to say, “I 
don’t want to be a cry-baby. Growing up, I was told, “Don’t you cry, Grown-ups 
don’t cry.”” At this stage I was made acutely aware of her inability to look me in the 
eyes. Her head hung low and she avoided my gaze, an indication as to her degree of 
shame at crying, at being so exposed and placed in such a vulnerable position (Exline, 
& Winters, 1965). The image of an ideal adult self being held up, and which could 
possibly have informed Maria’s shame in this instance, was the ideal of someone who 
did not cry, an ideal from which Maria seemingly felt herself falling short at that 
moment. As a result, she was positioned as a child, deemed unworthy in the eyes of 
the many people who may once have lead her to believe that crying is shameful 
behaviour, and whose judgements she seemed to have internalised.   
 
I replied, “So you don’t think it’s a very adult thing to do?” My fear of further placing 
her in an even more shameful position, dictated my response: by asking her to reflect 
on this question, I was attempting to illustrate that I might disagree with the 
assumption that crying is only for children, but at the same time wanted to respect this 
perspective by avoiding taking a confrontational stance, lest I be cast a critic. My own 
shame at this juncture in the interaction between us was also significantly informed by 
a feeling of having forced Maria into this vulnerable position against her will, prying 
open her very self in order to stare into what society had dictated was the ugliest, 
messiest and most shameful part of her. All of this purely to cater for my own 
academic needs, or what Guimaraes (2007) refers to as “holidaying on someone’s 
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misery” (p.158). As Sunde and Bozalek (1993) question, “Can white women 
contribute towards the struggle to make black women’s voices heard, or are we 
merely using their experiences to consolidate our own (tenuous) positions within the 
patriarchal academic structures in which we work?” (p. 32). 
 
Maria replied, “because what happens if you cry, people slam your face against walls. 
They take away your dignity, they take away your pride.” Her use of the ruthless 
metaphor of having one’s face slammed against a wall, exemplifies her feelings of 
anger towards the people in her life who have shamed her. As Broucek (1991) notes, 
“the face is the display board of the affects and the bodily site where the self is most 
localised” (p. 131). The metaphor served as a vivid, concrete example of what such 
severe feelings of shame might have felt like for her, particularly when one considers 
its violent depiction of the fragmentation of self.   
 
Maria continued by asking me, “How can someone sleep with you without asking? 
How can someone just do that to you? I mean, if I had the power, like he had, like my 
husband, the power, I mean…” at which point her thoughts appeared to drift off and 
she began to talk once more of her child who was waiting for her at home. The fact 
that Maria chose to engage in the use of the second person participle “you” as 
opposed to the first person singular “I” seems significant on various levels. It was 
firstly indicative of her desire to remove herself as the subject of the narrative, or 
indeed as the shamed object of scrutiny. Secondly, it highlighted the salience of our 
shared gendered identity and thirdly served as an invitation to me to place myself in 
her position, of imagining myself having been raped by someone who has slept with 
me without asking. Such a fantastical exercise served to aid my ability to empathise 
with the shame and subsequent feelings of anger and disbelief which Maria was 
expressing.    
 
As Broucek (1991) notes 
 
After we become aware of ourselves as objects for others, we hope that the 
other will at least regard us as “SUBJECT-objects,” that is, that the “subject” 
aspect of our dual nature for the other will be primary in the other’s response 
to us, thus affirming that we exist together in a field of shared affective 
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experience and overlapping consciousness rather then as disjunctive 
consciousnesses, surveying each other as mere object (p. 46).  
 
I would like to suggest that in asking these rhetorical questions, Maria was not 
looking for any particular response from me on a conscious level - the questions did 
not demand an answer and she gave me no time to respond. However, her questions 
intimated a deeply felt sense of shock and betrayal and in this sense they served as an 
invitation for me to acknowledge and share in her disbelief, a way of creating a shared 
affective experience, which I did. By so doing, I highlighted the salience of our 
common position as women, and validating Maria’s sense of a coherent, valuable self 
by suggesting that the actions of the rapist were objectively horrific and any woman in 
her position would have an equal right to feel shocked and betrayed without needing 
to feel any sense of personal responsibility for the event. In other words, any response 
to her questions which might reciprocate a similar feeling of disbelief would alleviate 
notions of personal blame. 
 
Maria’s questions elicited in me a feeling of shame related to my own internal 
thoughts of immunity to rape, a narcissistically imagined invincibility due to the fact 
of my own whiteness. Rape doesn’t happen in my neighbourhood, specifically not to 
nice Jewish girls. What rose in the space between us was a recognition of these 
thoughts, which Maria was able later to expose in a way with her comments that 
having a nice car will not necessarily prevent me from experiencing similar trauma. 
Within the intersubjective field, Maria’s need for similarity and identification on the 
basis of a common gendered identity was fighting for space with my own defensive 
need for distance and difference. I was ashamed that my own silent belief in immunity 
had been revealed, and was therefore unable to answer her question. Here, my silence 
acted as an admission of defeat, of acknowledging the shame that I carried which was 
so deeply connected to notions of my whiteness having marked me as being immune 
to domestic abuse. I feared that Maria might therefore think of me as having 
participated in what Hanson (1997) refers to as “the cruel social reaction to the cruelty 
of rape, yet another manifestation of the uneasiness of our individuality, our 
unsureness of the limits of our own autonomy, our anxiety about the extent to which 
we are subject to contingencies not freely chosen” (p. 177).    
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Maria continued to express a sense of pride on overcoming her crippling shame: “I’m 
not going to run away. I will never. I’m not going to run. I’m going to find people 
who are going to help me because I know people who care so much.” I asked which 
people she had in her life that would care for her, and she responded “Strangers…like 
yourself.”  I felt somewhat overwhelmed by the implications of her statement, in the 
responsibility that I felt it placed on me to be the caring, competent rescuer, which 
was in sharp distinction to my own feelings of inadequacy as a young, inexperienced 
researcher unsure of her own abilities. Was she relying on me to be an imagined ideal 
Other from which I would fall short? Had I promised too much? Stein (1995) notes 
that much of the shame arising from a feeling of the self being idealised underlies a 
fear of believing the Other lest they suddenly gain consciousness of the fact that the 
self is not worthy of idealisation.    
 
Similarly, I became acutely aware of the difference in meaning each of us had 
attributed to this encounter. What was for me another qualitative interview, couched 
in the objective, professional framework which that entailed, was for Maria the 
chance for her to share her story with a caring listener. I felt ashamed of the various 
ways in which I had objectified Maria for the purposes of my own research, at times 
not daring to open myself to a mutual exchange of subjectivities, attempting to create 
a defensive distance from her pain instead of relating to her in a subjective mode 
(Broucek, 1991).  
 
However, at the same time the moment allowed for the creation of a deeper level of 
understanding. I felt a moment of mutual acknowledgement pass in the space between 
us, as indicated by the validation of the shared meaning of our brief encounter. Maria 
told me that there was no one else to be trusted “because people talk behind your back. 
But I do know that there are people out there who care about me.” She recounted the 
ways in which she had been ostracised by many members of her community for being 
in an abusive relationship, and the shame she felt in having to pass people by on the 
streets in the knowledge that they were talking about her behind her back, marking 
her as inferior, unruly and deficient (Ussher, 2006).   
 
As a result of this shame, informed not only by the rape itself but by her community’s 
understanding of her abusive relationship with her husband, Maria said that “I can’t 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
allow another man to look at me, not even a doctor, a man doctor.” She contrasted this 
ostracism with the help and acceptance she had experienced at Thuthuzela Care 
Centre, specifically by the nurses who had offered her a “nice bath and made me feel 
much much better.” For Maria, the alleviation of her shame was significantly 
connected to the opportunity for a “nice wash”, a symbolic act of purification for her 
embodied self, a body viewed by many members of the community, and at times by 
herself, as being inherently contaminated. She later went on to tell me that “I had a 
very nice bath…I could just get into the bath and, well, I loved the bath. I loved it.” I 
mirrored the joy which Maria expressed in having been able to have a bath, and 
shared a smile with her, responding by commenting on how much better it seemed to 
have made her feel to have had a bath.  
 
She told me of the many ways in which she was “not herself,” “not the same person I 
used to be.” The experience of being raped, and the subsequent severation of herself 
from her community had tainted her identity irrevocably. She began to cry, turning to 
me and saying: 
 
I used to be like…when I look at you, as a young person, we’re about the same 
age and I think, I hope…I hope that you don’t have to go through so much 
pain. It really hurts. I hope you don’t have to. I hope nobody kicks you around. 
Because there’s no mercy, no mercy for a poor woman. You can have the car, 
you can have nice clothes, but don’t let anyone take that away from 
you…don’t let anyone do it.   
 
Her words marked a turning point in the interaction between us. I felt as though Maria 
had turned the tables in a way, positioning herself as the advice-dispensing expert 
holding significant power and authority, and myself in the position of the shamed and 
abused. I felt pinned down, trapped, “in a corner” in Maria’s words. My mind raced 
with images of her perception of me, the young white woman with the car and the 
clothes embodying a white middle-class ideal. Her marking my nice clothes and my 
nice car spoke directly to the reality of my socio-political background, “responsible 
for the material disadvantage of the majority of South Africans” (Kometsi, 2001, p. 
15).  
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Maria continued to say that “I could never imagine myself, not in a million years.” 
With those words, she once again shattered the illusion of my own perceived 
immunity to being in her position as a survivor of rape, immunity granted to me solely 
on the basis of my social position as a white woman. I felt as though this confidence 
in my own social identity, and subsequent disbelief in ever being placed in her 
position, had been exposed to her scrutiny. The encounter evoked in me a feeling of 
my own self being cast as inherently damaged and devalued, held up to the scrutiny of 
the Other and found lacking. From a self-psychological perspective, Maria’s allusion 
to our dimensions of similarity indicated a need for a twinship (or alter-ego) self-
object experience which would enable her to re-establish a secure sense of self which 
had at that moment been fragmented by a sense of shame and subsequent isolation 
(Kohut, 1966, 1977, Morrison, 1989). Paradoxically, what stood between us was a 
recognition of our common identities as young South African women, as well as our 
very obvious socio-economic differences as emphasised by Maria’s reference to “the 
car and nice clothes.”    
 
Maria continued by telling me that she knew her husband was going to leave her now, 
that he did not care for her anymore. She still felt in a corner and did not know when 
she would be out of it. I immediately felt the need to comment on my surprise to hear 
her fears that he was going to leave her, and to insist that she be the one to leave him. 
However, I was attempting to alleviate some of the shame that I had already felt out 
of a fear of having positioned myself as the superior expert on relationships. As a 
result, I chose not to challenge her statement and enquired instead as to her plans for 
returning home. She replied that she could not go home and that nobody knew where 
she was. She felt abandoned and completely isolated from any social network. 
According to Kaufman (1989), such feelings of abandonment connected with shame 
relates to the breaking of the interpersonal bridge , which is further severed by the 
isolating experience of shame itself, creating an ever-widening gulf between self and 
Other. 
 
Maria said that were she to go home, that she would not let her husband know that she 
had been at Thuthuzela, “I would say that I’ve been at someone else.” This provided 
me with insight into the shame felt by herself, and presumably many other women 
who came to Thuthuzela Care Centre, at having to come to a hospital centre to receive 
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medical and psychological help. I was only able to imagine the response of Maria’s 
husband, and other important people in their lives, in discovering that she had been 
there. The sense of silence and secrecy surrounding the space in which we were 
located mirrored the shame, silence and secrecy which so commonly shroud women’s 
experiences of abuse. The shame of having been placed in the vulnerable position of 
patient was reiterated in Maria’s subsequent words: “I don’t want to be a cry baby, 
first of all. I want to be strong,” indicating a sense of her felt powerlessness which 
Kaufman (1989) argues acts as one of the primary activators of shame affect. 
 
Maria told me of how she had waited at the police station for hours the day before in 
order to get an interdict against her husband: 
 
And when I came home, I left all those papers at my friend’s house because I 
know that he will take that away from me. They can take my clothes away so 
that I can’t go anywhere. They did take my clothes away, I can’t go anywhere. 
And sometimes they take my stuff, my money, my clothes…he always has his 
brother helping him. And he gave his brother a smile: “Listen, take my wife’s 
clothes” Take my personal stuff. And anyway, ummm…I went home. 
 
As she said this, Maria pointed to the hair on her head, indicating how her husband 
had grabbed her hair whilst chasing her. I was immediately filled with a sense of rage 
at the cruelty of her husband’s actions, unable to fully conceive of the sense of utter 
helplessness and humiliation I assumed must have arisen out of being so mercilessly 
objectified (Broucek, 1991). It would be possible to suggest that the shame evoked in 
Maria by such an encounter was significantly informed by a sense of having been 
objectified by her husband, seen as a bodily object to be exploited by other members 
of his family. The specific mechanisms of the exploitation were similarly striking: the 
association between shame and a feeling of nakedness is an archaic construction 
dating back to the Bible’s recounting of Adam’ shame of being found naked in the 
garden of Eden, an association alluded to in much of the shame literature. In Maria’s 
case, I hypothesise that her literal nakedness spoke to a much deeper sense of being 
mercilessly exposed and publicly shamed.  
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I listened silently as she recounted more and more of the details of the abuse and more 
specifically of the rape, and her sense of absolute powerlessness in the face of it: 
 
And then he pushed me down on the floor. That is why I had this bump here. 
It’s almost like he forced me down. And he held a screwdriver, an orange 
screwdriver, against my throat and he said that the more I screamed he would 
just stab me in the throat. Because I was already so tired and mixed up. I 
couldn’t push him away or anything. And he just forced himself on top of 
me….and then he had sex with me.   
 
She relayed the narrative with her head down low, avoiding eye contact and evidently 
distressed. Her shame was palpable. In retrospect, it is possible that Maria’s 
explanation of being “tired and mixed up” for not attempting to resist her husband at 
that moment served as a pre-emptive attempt to defend against the perceived blame 
which she believed I might have attributed to her, and which had been attributed to 
her by others for reportedly being unable to defend herself against her abusive 
husband. My own silence at this point in the encounter was due in part to a feeling of 
being overwhelmed with the depth of her pain and feeling a need to limit my 
identification with her distress and vulnerability. This resonates with the observations 
of Burman and Chantler, (2004), who, upon reflecting on their work researching 
domestic violence, noted that researchers themselves “might have often felt “shamed” 
because of their lack of engagement, and/or knowledge, or feelings of being 
overwhelmed both with issues of abuse and specifically in relation to minoritised 
women” (p. 390).         
 
Maria talked of how she had stayed with her child watching TV, after having been 
chased by her husband following the rape. Both herself and her child were so tired 
that “I couldn’t even look at her.” Her head had begun to get sore, and she asked 
herself “Why do you feel like this?” She looked down, and I was once more aware of 
the shame she felt in having been so violently abused in front of her child following 
the rape, a shame so paralysing that she was unable to look her child in the eyes. The 
sense of powerlessness came not only in feeling unable to prevent her husband from 
physically and sexually abusing her, but also in her shame about feeling ashamed in 
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front of her child. This appeared to have brought forth a jolt of recognition of her 
ashamed state, an example of what Morrison (1989) terms “secondary shame.”   
 
Maria then looked up, turned to me with some pride in her voice and said,  
 
And then I feel, for a second, that I wasn’t going to have it. And then I said to 
myself, “No Maria, remember you have your interdict. You did something” 
And then, “Don’t stop.” I wanted to stop, I wanted to get out…This morning I 
just got up and I just left. I just said to him, “You will never touch me again” 
And I left.    
 
Horney (1950) relates pride directly to shame, “pride and self-hate belong inseparably 
together, they are two expressions of one process” (p. 109).  From this perspective, 
Maria’s pride in leaving her husband was an attempt to regain a sense of autonomy 
and control, a way in which she could reclaim the situation and alleviate her shame. 
She referred once more to the “nice, fresh bath” that she had just been able to have, 
and told me that she wouldn’t have been able to talk to me had she not been able to 
take a bath. Her comment could be understood on many levels, and I was left 
wondering what to make of it. Was she suggesting that my intrusive questioning 
would have interrupted an important process of self-healing? Or would she have been 
too ashamed to speak to me if she felt physically unclean?  
 
Maria went on to say: 
 
Thank you for listening, and I hope that you keep up with what you’re doing. I 
know myself, I know that I can do it. God is all I have because God has put me 
here. I’m here for a special reason. And I hope that you will make something 
of your life. That’s the kind of person I used to be, talking to people. I can’t 
take your confidence away, I can never put you down.  
 
It could be argued that from Morrison’s (1989) self-psychological perspective located 
within narcissism, Maria’s belief in being there “for a special reason” may indicate a 
form of defensive grandiosity. Morrison argues that shame reflects “an on-going 
tension-generating dialectic between a narcissistic grandiosity and desire for 
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perfection, and the archaic sense of self as flawed, inadequate and inferior following 
realisation of seperateness from, and dependence on, objects. Similarly, a 
metaphorical dialectic exists between the wish for absolute autonomy and uniqueness 
and the wish for perfect merger and reunion with the projected fantasy of the ideal.” 
(p. 66). It could therefore be argued that Maria’s shame was inextricably linked to her 
grappling with feelings of narcissism. Her sense of “specialness” was imagined in 
terms of her self’s complete grandiosity, autonomy and independence, as well as in an 
imagined worthiness for merger with a fantasised ideal, a role which I had assumed to 
a certain extent in our encounter.  
  
Her words indicated a possible desire for merger with an idealised Other, viewed from 
within a self-psychological paradigm as a defence against feeling ashamed, was 
reflected in Maria’s direct reference to me being “the kind of person I used to be,” and 
her seemingly effortless weaving between referring to herself and referring to me as 
being able to “make something of your life.” This sense of narcissistic pride related to 
a symbiosis with an ideal Other was similarly reflected in Maria having expressed a 
sense of pride in having been able to find someone like me, someone “who cares.” 
Her apparent idealisation appears to have been based on the premise that the ideals of 
her own self, namely those in relation to being someone who cares, have been 
achieved in me (Morrison, 1998).  
 
It could be argued that Maria’s narcissistic construction of myself as being confident, 
caring and unwilling to let anyone “put me down,” were generated to deny and 
eliminate her own feelings of shame. This was particularly relevant to her own 
feelings of inadequacy relating to being unable to care for her child, which was 
implicitly compared to my own perceived ability to care for her. Her sense of shame 
surrounding an inability to “care” was subsequently indicated in her going on to tell 
me, “I can’t think of other people. I only think about myself.” This was immediately 
followed by her saying “A mother will never stay long away from her child, never.” 
She explained to me that a lot had been taken away from her and that it would 
therefore take time but she would like to get her life together. I understood this 
explanation as a way to defend against the shame inherent in her own perceived 
failure as a mother in staying away from her child, “a narcissistic reaction evoked by a 
lapse from the ego-ideal” (Lewis, 1971, p. 37): 
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 I’d like to get my life back together. And start walking away from the people 
that hurt me the most. That I love the most. So then I look, you know, I cry 
and cry. So if I look at my life, I look at a road, but there’s no end. And it 
looks as though there are a lot of stumbles that come my way. I’m ready for it. 
I thought I wasn’t ready for it, but I am. That’s why I made my choice to get 
the interdict. 
 
Maria’s reflections on her own life path reflected an acquisition of objective self-
awareness associated with shame, a “tearing of oneself from the self” (Broucek, 1991, 
p. 38) which marks the beginning of a possible relationship with herself as well as a 
possible self-alienation. Interestingly, her despair and shame were juxtaposed with a 
sense of pride and achievement in having acquired the interdict, symbolising her own 
power, autonomy and control.  
 
Maria went on to explain that “because I’m Muslim, I don’t have any rights towards 
the husband,” further marking the socio-cultural and religious differences between us. 
She expressed a sense of powerlessness which she perceived as being inherent to her 
own identity as a Muslim wife, and all the duties and obligations which that seemed to 
entail for her. She felt that as a Muslim wife, “they take your money away…because 
if it’s his T.V. it will stay his T.V.” Thus, the acknowledgement of religious 
difference brought with it an acknowledgement of the socio-economic implications of 
that religious difference, an expression of the meaning which she attributed to her 
own cultural and religious heritage. Maria’s identity as a Muslim wife was not only 
informed by her religious beliefs but also by the socio-cultural, religious and 
economic matrix in which she was embedded. As Lynd (1958) notes, “the more fully 
one is aware of his own individual identity, the more fully he is aware of the 
immensity of the universe and his own place within it” (p. 255). Maria told me that as 
a Muslim woman: 
 
I have to give other people lots of power, in higher places. Like the law, like 
people, you know. I can judge them because they can assure me that it’s not 
me. I know it’s not me, but if someone tells you, “It’s you, it’s you, it’s you,” 
then you keep on remembering that it’s you.  
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 The transfer of power from Maria to other people “in higher places” brought with it a 
sense of giving up her own autonomy to people who are imbued with the power to 
pass judgement on who is and who is not deserving of blame. Maria cast herself in the 
powerful position of judge who was able to critically review the opinions of others 
who attempt to reassure her. However, she simultaneously presented herself as the 
object of judgement, being exposed to the scrutinising voice of the ubiquitous, 
anonymous “they” who attributed the blame to her. The power which Maria spoke of 
giving up was thus equated with the somehow socially sanctioned right to pass 
judgement. The sense of shame which she expressed was deeply imbedded in this 
sense of being so mercilessly judged, relating to the root meaning of the word shame 
as to uncover, to expose, to wound (Lynd, 1958). Maria’s words spoke to a process of 
a self-evaluative internalisation, whereby she hears the accusations of the external 
Other and internalises the severe criticisms to the extent that she herself believes that 
she is to blame; “you keep on remembering it’s you.”  
 
Maria also brought in the voice of her husband, who was telling her that “it’s because 
of you. It’s because of what you did. It’s because of what you made me into.” In that 
instance, the accusatory voice casting shame on Maria was not the imagined faceless 
mass of judges, which could be read as forming some manifestation of social audience, 
but was specifically the voice of her husband who was cast as the humiliator. She 
asked me, “Why must I run around and scream and look like a mad person? I don’t 
want him to make me mad.” Her expressed fear was one of being pathologised or of 
being driven mad. Broucek (1991), argues that the shame of being seen as mad relates 
to the self being objectified as a flawed object of scrutiny, in need of being watched 
under close surveillance, as opposed to being understood and related to in a subjective 
and experience-close paradigm. Her words spoke directly to my own fear that, by 
engaging in such a process of research, I was similarly objectifying her experiences. I 
felt ashamed that my position as researcher might be one equally as pathologising and 
objectifying.     
 
Maria went on to speak about her work as a hairdresser and the sense of autonomy her 
employment gave her: “I don’t depend on him financially to support me. That’s the 
one thing he can’t take away from me. I can support myself … I’ve got my own tools.” 
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She explained that being financially independent was of huge significance for her in 
reclaiming a sense of pride in moments of the most acutely felt shame, because 
 
When he hits me, all crumpled up, all hurt, he kicks me, he’s injured me, he 
gives me the … I feel I have no hope. But I pick myself up and I blow 
someone’s hair. 
  
At this stage of our interaction, Maria seemed to have regained a stronger sense of 
control, as was exemplified in her subsequent comment that “from this point to that 
point, it’s all up to me.” This control was similarly reflected in the structure of our 
narrative, which she was dictating in that instance, whilst my own silence was making 
space in the interaction for her to carry on. She continued: 
 
Because that’s what makes me happy, [to] make my hair nice again, make my 
clothes nice again, make myself presentable. Because the way that you look is 
the way that people treat you. If you look nice, people treat you nice. If you 
look like, clothes just hanging, you look like a mad person. 
 
Once more there was a reference to a fear of being pathologised by an Other, of 
looking “like a mad person.” A sense of being marked as psychologically damaged 
was equated with being inadequately or poorly clothed. Thus, there was an implicit 
connection made between a presentation of an ideal self, as revealed through an 
attractive body which would be socially receivable, and a presentation of the body 
which would lead to being treated as “mad”, which in that case could presumably be 
read to imply a self which is fundamentally bad, damaged or deviant and ultimately 
regarded as socially rejected, devaluated and shamed (Gilbert, 2002). 
 
She continued by comparing her own physical appearance to mine: 
 
You look nice with your pink jersey…you like a woman that’s in control of 
her life. That’s what I want to look like, not like you, or be you. I can’t be you, 
you are you. I just want to be like you. Just be so confident. Just go 
somewhere. Just treat people with respect and be like a human being, not like 
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a hoender been [chicken bone]. A hoender been you eat and then you throw it 
away.   
 
It can be argued that in her construction of me as “confident” and “in control,” Maria 
imbued me with a power which she referred to as having been “stripped away” from 
her by her husband. Morrison (1989) refers to the interaction between envy and shame, 
suggesting that  
 
“envy leads to the identification (via projective identification) with the 
powerful object, which becomes a possession under the control of the 
self…for envy of the powerful object to flourish, the object must be compared 
with the shame ridden, incompetent self” (p. 108).  
 
Seen from this perspective, her words mark me as the powerful object worthy of 
respect, which sits in stark contrast to Maria’s own depiction of herself which 
positions her as a less-than-human chicken bone. Interestingly, the respect her words 
mark me as deserving, is intrinsically linked to my “nice pink jersey” – possibly 
signifying material wealth and thus indicating the link between socio-economic status 
and immunity from shame. The words thus speak once more to the class differences 
which existed so profoundly between us.   
 
Maria went on to reiterate the fact that she was proud of meeting someone who cares, 
a statement which reinforces Morrison’s notion of shame leading to identification and 
potential merger with an envied Other. The idealised, caring Other I seemed to have 
represented at that moment for Maria extended into her own sense of self in the sense 
that it was her who had been able to “find someone who cares.” This resonates with 
Kohutian theories that a shame-driven need for the reparation and maintenance of the 
self depends on the unconditional availability of the approving mirror-functions of an 
admiring self-object or on the potential for merger with an idealised one (Kohut, 1966, 
1977). 
 
I replied by acknowledging how difficult it could be for people to talk about their 
experiences like she had done. The motivation for my words was two-fold. Firstly, in 
that moment I had become acutely aware my own shame in perceiving myself not to 
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be the caring, ideal Other and of my subsequent desire to detract attention from the 
uncomfortable feeling of being idealised so overtly by placing her as the subject of 
our co-constructed narrative, a subject worthy of praise and admiration. This attitude 
among feminist researchers is referred to by Featherstone (1997) as “maternal 
ambivalence” where women working with abuse ward off fantasies of some kind of 
essential harmony and the corresponding shame that is generated when such fantasies 
are frustrated. Secondly, through the expression of my own admiration for Maria, I 
was attempting to acknowledge that the potentially shaming experience she may have 
been going through in having to recount the rape to me, thereby attempting to provide 
some alleviation from the shame pervading the intersubjective space we had created 
in order to replace it with a sense of pride and of accomplishment. This lead Maria to 
reflect on how ashamed she had initially felt in the beginning of our interaction: 
 
At the beginning you feel like, how can you cry to a stranger? I mean, I don’t 
know you. I don’t know where you come from. So I don’t know if I can trust 
you. I don’t know if I hate you! I expected you to chase me away, but you 
didn’t….so I can just lift up my eyes.  
 
This acknowledgement of the strangeness of the situation served to further emphasise 
the marked differences in our identities, “where we came from.” It is evident that 
Maria’s sense of shame for having cried was significantly compounded by our distinct 
differences in identity – “how can you cry to a stranger?” I believe that our racial, 
religious and socio-economic differences may have served to heighten a sense of 
mistrust between us, mediated through a feeling of Otherness, of having little 
common ground with which to navigate the interaction. The fact that Maria was 
expecting me to chase her away indicates her own profound sense of self as so 
fundamentally flawed or damaged that chastisement, ostracism and ridicule from an 
Other are only to be assumed. A reflection on the degree of devaluation which 
occurred as a result of the abuse can be seen in Maria’s following words:  
 
I don’t know if I can ever look at people again but after the crying and tears, I  
can look up and I can say, “You don’t deserve it.” Nobody does, but when I 
look down I can’t face a person. I feel that I can chase you and hurt you the 
way that I am hurt.  
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 Her words speak to an implicit link between the degree of shame, experienced as 
social devaluation, and the capacity to look people directly in the eye, in other words 
to face them as being on an equal social footing. Maria was referring to a shame 
which would quite literally be exposed through the body, more specifically through 
her facial expression, were she to look someone in the eye. The implicit assumption 
being mutually created and understood in that instance between us was that if one 
feels good or comfortable about relating to another he or she would engage in mutual 
glances (Exline and Winters, 1965).  
 
There is a strong allusion to the rage Maria might have been feeling in response to 
having been so shamed. A revenge seeking fantasy (Herman, 1992) of placing herself 
in the position of humiliater, was evident in her expressed desire to “chase you and 
hurt you the way I am hurt.” This reflects a tension between the ideal self, someone 
worthy of respect who does not deserved to be sexually abused, and who has the 
power to chase, to hurt, to humiliate, and the shamed self who “can’t face a person.”  
Interestingly, the juxtapositioning of Maria’s words implicitly create a correlation 
between feeling ashamed (“I can’t face a person”) and feeling the need for revenge (“I 
can chase you and hurt you”), suggesting that the two are inextricably linked.   
 
It is striking that the alleviation of such shame, expressed by Maria as a feeling of 
being able to look someone in the eye again, was only made possible “after the crying 
and the tears.” Despite the fact that this was not the aim of our meeting, her words 
indicate that the journey which we had taken together had been a psychologically 
beneficial one for her. The space was filled with talk of pride, of Maria’s hope for 
being able to once more look people in the eyes. Her own hopefulness and expressed 
transformation through “the crying and the tears” resonated with my own sense of 
hopefulness surrounding a belief in having conducted a “good” interview – measured 
by a sense that I had acted in a sufficiently professional manner, and had elicited 
content-rich and meaningful material without leaving with a sense that I had in some 
way emotionally exploited a psychologically distressed research subject.  
 
The sense of hopefulness which dominated the tone of the narrative in that instance 
may indeed have served to metabolise and remediate some of the shame within the 
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space which we had created, a way for both of us to have constructed a 
psychologically more coherent and bearable space in which to part. In retrospect, my 
comparative silence throughout the interview may be attributed to both my own 
shame regarding my relatively privileged position in relation to Maria, but equally to 
a sense of the silence as an appropriate indication of respect for her in making space 
for her voice to be heard. Ironically, it is her voice which dominated the dialogue 
throughout our interaction, yet her story remains spoken through my own strong 
interpretive voice as author.   
 
Thus, our parting was strongly informed by a tension between the various 
manifestations of shame which had arisen in the space between us, and a need to 
counteract it through reclaiming a sense of pride and hopefulness for the future. This 
was reflected in Maria’s parting words, which spoke to a self which had been 
shattered by shame, and a presumably deeply-felt desire to reclaim a socially 
acceptable, coherent self:  
 
In my community, I am not a person that’s weak. I’m a person that people 
look up to. If they could see me now, they’d never believe it. They would just 
shake their head. And I want that back. I want me back. The way I used to be.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Shame is difficult to track, due to its elusive nature. We go to considerable lengths to 
conceal the affect. We hide our shame behind the guises of anger, envy, contempt or 
depression. However, our behaviour and our language, the various ways in which we 
experience both our own shame and that of the Other is unmistakably palpable, 
enabling us to feel and explore its many channels and permutations in the 
intersubjective space between self and Other (Morrison, 1998). It is likely to be 
expressed in physical appearance as well as behaviour. Typically, the head hangs 
forwards, eyelids droop, the brow furrows and the gaze is cast downward, body 
posture is stooped and the gait is slow and shuffling (Exline, & Winters, 1965, Lewis, 
1971). One of the limitations in analysing the various manifestations of shame within 
the intersubjective space between Maria and myself is the fact that the data analysed 
comprised of a written transcript (transcribed verbatim from a digital recording of the 
interview). Thus, analysis was limited by the neglect of the physical dimension of our 
meeting in tracking what is arguably one of the most visibly conveyed of all the 
emotions (Morrison, 1998).   
 
Despite this significant limitation, the analysis reveals the ubiquitous manifestations 
of shame within the intersubjective space, traceable through the three markers of the 
affect; namely the content of the narrative, the form or structure of the interaction as 
well as my own emotional memory of the event. Often shame cannot be thought or 
talked about directly, but may be signified through a choice of words which serves 
either to describe or disguise itself. Our shame is accompanied by envy, rage, 
contempt and idealisation mediated through the relational defences of projection, 
splitting and introjection (Hollway, 1989). As Morrison (1998) notes, “fortunately, the 
language of shame often gives clues, if the listener is open to perceiving them” (p. 39). 
The words of myself and Maria reflected a piece of self-experience which is a clear 
example of the impact of shame, the roles of socio-cultural identity in the generation 
of shame and the way in which shame is readily defended against through other 
emotions.  
 
Shame is an individualistic, subjective response to a uniquely constructed experience. 
However, certain categories of experience may predictably lead to acute feelings of 
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shame connected to both its public and private triggers (Morrison, 1998). Rape is one 
such category. The dualistic role of the shame of rape is linked to the fact that the act 
itself, in its violation and humiliation of the survivor, is inherently shaming. 
Furthermore, the survivor’s belief that she is to blame, generated intrapsychically or 
as a result of societal attitudes towards the abuse, compound the shame. Brison (1997) 
observes that trauma of human origin “severs the connection between the self and the 
rest of humanity. Victims of human-inflicted trauma are reduced to mere objects: their 
subjectivity is rendered useless and viewed as worthless” (p. 15). The shame which 
attaches itself so strongly to rape, framed the interaction between myself and Maria on 
numerous levels by opening up a veritable Pandora’s box of shameful feelings. 
However, despite the rape itself having acted as a metaphorical magnifying glass 
underscoring the shame between us, it only served to highlight a pre-existing shame 
inevitably framing our interaction.  
    
Our co-constructed shame was partly framed by the racial differences strikingly 
evident between us, so boldly reflected through our bodies. The racial and religious 
differences existing between myself and Maria, speak to a power divide which 
profoundly influenced the dialogue which unfolded between us. As Leary (2000) and 
Harris (2000) propose, our racialised subjectivity are identities lived under the yoke of 
social shaming and oppression – we see skin as bearing depth and social surface, see 
the body as material and social, see the psyche historicised. For this reason, several 
African feminists have, in recent years, suggested that the exploration of “whiteness” 
should be a primary political focus of white feminists working in Africa (Bennett & 
Friedman, 1997). My own identity as a white, Jewish, middle-class and University-
educated female profoundly coloured my own experience of self, of Maria, and 
necessarily my perception of the intersubjective space we had created - inevitably 
viewed through my own specific paradigms.  
 
Despite the fact that my relationship with Maria was one of interviewer-interviewee, 
as opposed to analyst-patient, our relationship was undoubtedly cast in many ways by 
the same shame-inducing asymmetry of a pre-existing frame, me in position of neutral 
expert and Maria in the vulnerable position of psychologically distressed subject. Her 
shame in being identified as a survivor of rape resonated with my own shame in 
asking her to expose the painful and humiliating experience, and my own feelings of 
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inadequacy related to the falling short of a professional ideal. As Orange (1995) notes, 
there is no such thing as an infant, there is no such thing as a patient, and there is no 
such thing as the patient or the analyst’s shame. I would similarly extend her 
argument to suggest that in the interaction between us, there was no such thing as my 
shame or Maria’s shame. Instead, our interaction was shaped in a fundamental way by 
the shame which arose in the space between us, a shame intrinsically linked to the 
politics of knowledge production and to the inadequacies and exclusionary 
characteristics of prevailing institutional practises regarding the authority of 
privileged researchers (Burman, 2004; Gray, 2008; Taylor, 1996).  
 
Research from within a feminist reflexive framework demands recognition of the 
powerful yet subtle ways in which shame can significantly inform the research 
relationship. Unacknowledged shame may lead to researchers themselves having 
trouble maintaining neutrality and to research participants becoming idealised or 
vilified rather than seen as they are (Scheff, & Retzinger, 1997). It is therefore critical 
that the powerful influence of shame is considered in feminist reflexive practise. This 
is particularly pertinent given the renewed interest in a wider “reflexive turn” in the 
emotional politics of feminist research which considers the research interview as the 
point or moment of contact at which subjectivity is formed, negotiated and 
manoeuvred about  (Burns, 2003, Jensen, 2008, Rice, 2009). As Rice (2009) argues,  
 
Feminist investigators have explored influences of identities such as race, 
class, gender, age, ability and nation on researchers’ interactions with 
respondents and on the integrity of knowledge they produce…. Significantly, 
such an insight may point to the importance of not retreating to familiar axes 
of power and oppression (race, class and gender) as primary interpretive lens 
when researching women (p. 262) 
 
Given the return of the body and emotions as a site for feminist and psychological 
inquiry, and a focus on the “emotional geographies” of the research relationship 
(Burman, 2004, 2006; Burman & Chantler, 2004), what is called for is a reflexivity 
that takes into account much more than an acknowledgement of the ways in which we 
‘affect’ the data collected and how our own (powerful) subject positions are 
implicated in research. Analyses of power relations which focus solely on structural, 
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namely racial, inequalities within the research space are limited – what is called for is 
a focus on what Burman (2003), terms the “intersectionality” of multiple differences 
as a promising starting point for critical thinking and practise. This would enable a 
deeper consideration of the constantly shifting degrees of transparency and obscurity, 
connection and separation that recur in the multiple relations that constitute reflexive 
research and knowing (Doucet, 2008). As Gray (2008) argues 
 
Emotional identifications and attachments are central to the (re)framing of the 
object of study and the politics of knowledge production. Thus, attempts to 
find more reliable grounds for knowledge claims must be located in the 
interrelated landscapes of feeling, intellect and politics (p. 935).  
 
This is particularly relevant to the South African context of qualitative psychological 
research, largely dominated by white women interviewing black and coloured women 
(Motsei, 2007) in a context of high levels of trauma, specifically gender-based 
violence, HIV/AIDS and poverty – a landscape creating a veritable breeding ground 
for shame. Swartz (2007) marks that discussions of race in South Africa, particularly 
those situated within a professional context, are often laden with anxiety, and that a 
shame-induced avoidance of naming or confronting such anxiety can cause a 
debilitating paralysis. Therefore, in such a context, we need to not only track the 
effect of shame on the research subsequently produced, but to similarly be guided by 
ethical principles in considering its “extra-discursive” effects on participants (Burns, 
2003; Rice, 2009). Such a consideration would arguably be in line with Mama’s 
(2007) call for African intellectuals in particular “to engage more proactively with the 
methodological implications of their own liberatory intellectual ethics…framed by 
considerations of identity” (p. 1) in the context of multiple axes of difference, 
inequalities and relational politics.    
 
It is the very fact that we are so deeply embedded in this socio-political context which 
holds the key to relational transformation, offering us the opportunity to acknowledge 
the affects of our own context on the way in which we perceive the Other, reshaping 
our realities and transforming the lens through which we view the world. Thus:” 
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 We have an unparalleled opportunity to understand better what lives inside us 
unconsciously, by looking closely at what happens in encounters with what we 
as individuals experience not just as otherness but as the forbidden, the taboo. 
For every person, the contents, the anxiety will be different. There is no 
generic way of looking at race in analysis – or gender, or sexuality – it will be 
as unique as our own subjectivity and projected fear (Swartz, 2007, p. 362). 
 
However, there is similarly a need to challenge discourses of transparency which 
invite researchers to subject themselves to the scrutiny of others through an incitement 
to confession. I would argue that such subjugation is, ironically, also motivated by the 
shame of our limitations as researchers. If reflection necessarily “requires an ability to 
view oneself as others view one” (Stephenson, Kippax, & Crawford, 1996, p. 183), it 
is the inherently shaming experience of confession through a “penetrating gaze” 
(Gray, 2008, p. 936). Such confessional technologies being brought into feminist 
reflexive writing may equally threaten to become a new tool of regulation, 
normalising and circumscribing emotional expression (Burman, 2006). Indeed, 
particular perceptions of reflexivity are becoming the index for judgements regarding 
what is “good” and what is “bad” research (Gray, 2008). Finlay (2002), for example, 
goes so far as to name the process of reflexivity one of “outing” the researcher, 
connoting the shaming process of exposing one’s subjectivity. Furthermore, the 
academic language and tone within which such reflexivity is situated may lead to a 
retreat of the privileged researcher into inaccessible and insular “ivory tower angst” 
(Langhout, 2006, p.272), “navel-gazing” or an “impasse” of research underlined by 
fears of (mis)representation (Sultana, 2007, p. 375). Rather, this particular analysis 
has outlined the positionality of shame, the way in which it is not only located in 
individual interiority but reactively constructed in the intersubjective. An 
understanding of such reflexivity should therefore be widened from a self-centred 
exercise to consider the critical relations which shape academic work (Doucet, 2008).  
 
Shame is a powerfully communicating affect with potentially paralysing effects. 
Alleviating its noxious effects requires an awareness and acceptance of its ubiquitous 
presence in our lives, as well as the conditions in which shame plays an important part 
(Morrison, 1998). The recent burgeoning of shame-related literature, and a particular 
exploration of its manifestations on the micro-level of the research relationship 
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through the analytic resource of psychodynamic understanding, has highlighted the 
necessity of feminist reflexive practise considering shame. We need to reflexively 
locate the emotion within our racialised, gendered and institutionalised research 
relationships, and to wrestle with the implications this has for meaning-making and 
embodied subjectivity. Such a consideration would arguably provide invaluable 
insights for feminist reflexive research and practise as it pays critical attention to 
positionality, reflexivity, the production of knowledge and the power relations that are 
inherent in research processes.   
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